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
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CONCEPTUAL COMPARISON OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

I start my discussion by taking extreme and contrasting views about the concepts of knowledge and belief. These extreme contrasting features are: whereas knowing implies what is known is to be true, believing does not imply what is believed is to be true; secondly whereas the former implies that the knower must be completely sure and certain about his knowledge, the latter does not imply that the person believing must be completely sure and certain about his beliefs; thirdly whereas in the first case that knower has good and sufficient reason for what he knows, in the second case the person believing may not have good or sufficient reasons, or in fact any reason whatsoever, for holding his beliefs. I call the three criteria determining the corresponding contrasting distinctions as objective, subjective, and foundational. These criteria are conceptually interrelated; knowledge or knowing is related to a conscious being and a person claiming to have knowledge claims to have the objective truth. He does not doubt his assertion, otherwise he would not sincerely claim to have knowledge or objective truth. A claimant cannot doubt at the time of his sincerely claiming to know, otherwise he would be disclaiming his own claim and that leads to self-contradiction. An analogy from promise is relevant here. A person cannot say without self-contradiction that he promises (sincerely) to return the goods but does not intend to return them. Likewise a claimant to have knowledges cannot say that he has certain doubts about his having the knowledge or objective truth. He cannot doubt his own assertion without self-contradicting himself. Having no doubt means being completely satisfied or sure with himself. Hence the objective criterion is related to the subjective one. Knowledge cannot be thought to be independent of some conscious being, some knowing and thinking being. A thinking being cannot stop thinking about the rationale or

grounds of one's own or of other's assertion. It means, he cannot be satisfied with bare assertions of certain pieces of knowledge: he would like to know the grounds of the assertions. Hence all the three conditions or criteria for knowledge are interlinked. On the other hand, belief does not imply the truth of what is believed. When a statement does not imply that it is also true, it may be doubted or suspected. It means, the objective criterion of belief is here related to its subjective one. Again if the statement believed is doubtful, it means that the person concerned does not have sufficient evidence or grounds for the statement, otherwise he would also know it and not simply believe it. The person concerned may not have in fact any reason for his belief. He may have it just by chance or hunch. He may have acquired it by imitating his fellowmen. A child may have seen a strange sort of creature in his dreams and may later believe that this creature exists forgetting all about what he dreamt. Hence the three criteria or characteristic of belief are conceptually interwoven. Thus given a conscious being he may have contrasting and mutually exclusive (though not collectively exhaustive) mental states or attitudes or dispositions towards a certain statement, viz., Knowing and believing. To repeat; Both knowledge and belief require a certain conscious being. But in the case of knowledge what is known must be true, the conscious being is absolutely sure about his assertion and he has sufficient or conclusive reasons for his assertion. Whereas in the case of belief, what is believed may not be true, the conscious being concerned is not absolutely or completely certain about his belief or assertion and he may not have any or sufficient or conclusive reason for holding his belief.

The above-mentioned contrast exhibits only ideal or extreme situation. But all words or concepts have their own nuances and independent development with the growing and changing situations, irrespective of their any contrasting relation with some other words or concepts. Likewise the concepts 'knowledge' and 'belief' have their own several usages and nuances, which depart considerably from their extreme connotation elicited earlier. Not only in several cases the contrast fails but also their independent usages have a lot of flexibility so as not to have any characteristics common in all of them. The Wittgensteinian concept of family resemblance applies here as much as in any other concepts. Let us therefore try to have the analysis of the concepts of knowledge and belief as such in order

also to throw light on their interrelationships, comparison and contrast.

We take the first presumably essential characteristic of knowledge viz. , Knowledge, or what is known must be true. In certain diluted form of usages of the phrase "I know....." one is concerned mainly about the assertion of one's own subjective mental state of knowledge rather than with the assertion of objective truth. Again in direct contrast there are usages having the word 'known' where the question of truth does not arise. In several cases of "knowing how to" the question of truth is irrelevant, although the activities involved are mental, cognitive and creative. For example, ability to make or appreciate jokes do involve intelligent performances. Thus a person may know how to create or appreciate jokes or pieces of arts, but the question of truth is missing. Many philosophers would deny the label of truth to aesthetic and moral fields, but they and we do in fact have the ability of knowing how to make aesthetic and moral judgements. It may be protested that we are taking too much liberty in generously extending the notion of knowledge. There are two ways open to restrict our liberty: we may exclude from the disposition or activities of "knowing how to" the cases where the question of truth is irrelevant and include only those cases in the lap of knowledge where this question of truth genuinely exists. For example, knowing how to solve a mathematical problem leads to knowing the answer to the problem. 'Knowing how to' is a sort of ability or skill to do certain thing and in cases of cognitive activities leads to the acquisition of certain knowledge or information, or provides us data for making a rational belief. The question thus emerges how to make a clear-cut bifurcation of the concept 'knowing how to' and to sift out genuine cases of knowledge. There are both physical and mental activities which may fall under this heading. Cycling and swimming are mainly learned physical skills, which even animals like elephants and monkeys may 'know how to'. Again one may swim or skate with pleasure without obtaining any 'knowledge' of these skills. Normally the phenomenon of knowledge is associated with higher mental faculties, which lower animals in the scale of animal kingdom do not possess. Hence this way to approach knowledge complicates the matter in two ways, viz., (a) the difficulties of evolving certain criteria to maintain the link between knowledge and truth, (b) higher kind of consciousness and thinking no longer remain necessary for knowledge. In order to separate genuine cases of 'knowing how to' in (b) we may legislate

that the term is to be applicable where man or being who possesses equal or higher mental faculties than those of a human being is to be regarded the knower. Even here one may meet border-line cases or cases lying on the other side of the border. Suppose a certain person have true dreams and even on being awake he may claim to have knowledge of certain events. Should we say, this is unconscious or subconscious knowledge? Some may claim that even in such dreams man is fully conscious or well-awake to mental activities going on those times and it is not right to discredit these activities during sleep by dubbing them sub-conscious or unconscious. There is such a phenomenon as forgetting one's fully conscious activities and it may happen when we are awake at day-break we forget that we were conscious sufficient enough to have knowledge during dreams. Again some animals, say chimpanese and dolphins may have insights and may show conscious activities. It is difficult to demarcate precisely the real levels of consciousness needed for knowledge. These are not so damaging remarks because we do in fact deal with human knowledge and also these are secondary or peripheral considerations which do not touch the heart or centre of the problem. But the first difficulty (viz.a) stands alarming. We cannot have strict rules to sift right kinds of 'knowing how to' from the wrong ones. A wit may combine with wisdom, a joyful feat or trick may conjoin a scientific or empirical discovery. We do not have as a matter of fact any such rules, neither we can have. Again there are Philosophers like Ryle who would protest against the existence of such rules, for such rules would be of the nature of "knowing that". But for them the real knowing lies in "knowing how to" as will be soon elaborated below.

To accomodate these defects there is a second way open to exclude irrelevant cases of 'knowing how to'. This second way is to reduce the concept of 'knowing how to' to 'knowing that', or at least to link the former concept to the latter one. Several philosophers, particularly professor Ryle, would protest this reduction or dependence. For Ryle this would amount to accepting Cartesian dualism, of which he is an arch-enemy. He has some sort of behaviouristic account of mind. He says: (Concept of Mind, pp. 129,53,42 etc., Penguin Books)

Roughly, I believe' is of the same family as motive words; where 'know' is of the same family as skill words; so we ask how a person knows this, but only why a person believes that skills have methods, where habits

and inclinations have sources. Similarly, we ask what makes people believe or dread things but not what makes them know or achieve things.

Of course belief and knowledge (when it is knowledge that) operate, to put it crudely, in the same field. The sort of things that can be described as known or unknown can also be described as believed or disbelieved, somewhat as the sort of things that can be manufactured are also the sort of things that can be exported. Again he elaborates his point of view:

a spectator who cannot play chess cannot follow the play of others: a person who cannot read or speak Swedish cannot understand what is spoken or written in Swedish; and a person whose reasoning powers are weak is bad at following and retaining arguments of others. Understanding is a part of knowing how For one person who see the jokes that another makes, the one thing he must have is a sense of humor.....

Again in order to bring home the nature of knowing as dispositional concept or skills or "knowing how" and to make differentiation of such concepts as believing he say:

The ability to give by rote the correct solution of multiplication problems differs in certain respects from the ability to solve them by calculation..... doing some thing by pure or blind habit, we mean he does it automatically and without having to mind what he is doing..... It is the essence of merely habitual practice that one performance is a replica of its predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligence practices that one practice is modified by its predecessors. The agent is still learning.

..... We build up habits by drill, but we build up intelligent capacities by training. Drill (or conditioning consists in the impositions of repetitions..... Drill dispenses with intelligence, training develops it.

The purpose of these quotations is to show that for Ryle the essence of knowledge is "knowledge how to" and not "knowing that" "Knowing that" is just an instance of its application. Holders of such a view need not face the above critical remarks. And it is a fact that Ryle often uses the concept of 'knowing how' and its various cognates without having any relation to truth. But obviously we want to restrict ourselves to such related concepts which have connection,

if not with actual then with possible objective fact or reality. Which means, we need to restrict ourselves to those uses of "knowledge" and "belief" which have relation to some actual or possible truth.

With these remarks let us proceed to search whether 'knowing how' can somehow be tagged to 'knowing that'. The first thesis I want to put forward is that every case of 'knowing that' involves epistemologically and psychologically the 'knowing how to'. We learn to assert 'knowing that', we learn to recognise tables, chairs and other things. This learning-process is nothing but learning to 'knowing how to'. A baby learns to be familiar with and to get to know facts. This is the psychological aspect of 'knowing how to'. But there is also epistemological aspect. Take a simple example.

"I know that there is a brown table in this room". One type of epistemologist would build his epistemological edifice on sense-data theory. The table is nothing but a bundle of certain actual and possible sense-data. He would take sense-data as basic starting-point and through logical reconstructions would have physical objects. This is a phenomenalist stand-point. But another philosopher may totally reject this sort of approach. He might say that by this rationalistic way of 'knowing how to' we can never reach at objective things. He may take the starting basic point the very physical objects and may assert that it is only through logical and psychological analysis that we may reach at sense-data. We know physical objects directly by meeting them, striking against them, by adopting certain behaviour towards them. Perhaps both epistemological accounts have some truth in them. But such accounts of 'knowing how to' (psychologically and epistemologically) lead to our 'knowing that' there is a table in this room. On the other hand 'knowing how to' involves a lot of 'knowing that'. The more complicated 'knowing how to' is the more 'knowing that' is involved. For 'knowing how to' build a house involves lot of 'knowing that' the material used is of standard type, that the plot used has proper soil underneath it, that the walls and archs are properly placed etc: etc. Ultimately which is basic: 'knowing how to' or 'knowing that'. I think, this not the proper question to ask. It is a question like the question which came first, egg or hen? Although 'knowing how to' and 'knowing that', like egg and hen, are interconnected and interdependent, they have also their independent existence. 'knowing how to' and 'knowing that' though somehow interdependent, follow their own independent existence and logic also. It is thus no wonder

if both the concepts have certain similarities and dissimilarities. We may forget how to solve a certain mathematical problem after having known how to solve it, and we may also forget that the book was on the table after having known that it was there. But take the example of knowing other's mind. One cannot observe the mind of another person. One comes to know that another person has a mind when one comes to know the other's disposition of behaving intelligently. It is the knowledge "how to" both in my own case as well as in the case of others that leads me to conclude or know that we all have minds, although in my case I have direct knowledge or experience of my own mental phenomena. From this example it is clear that we cannot simply reduce 'knowing that' although the connection is there.

I may here hasten to point out that during my present discussion I did not take care to make distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description after the fashion of Russell, although I cannot just reduce knowledge of acquaintance to 'knowing that'. Some languages, for example German, have different words to express this distinction. In German we have two words, viz., 'Knnen' which has a direct object, and 'wissen' to represent this difference. In knowledge by acquaintance we directly know the object in question. For Russell and several others sense-data are known directly but we gain knowledge of many other thing through description and this description somehow hangs on sense-data. We know by acquaintance entities. We did not make this distinction because our immediate purpose was to show some contrast of 'knowing how to' with other sorts of knowledge. Both knowledge by acquaintance and 'knowing that' are 'propositional' knowledge but 'knowing how to' is a knowledge of skill. And this contrast was sufficient for our purpose. We started with a specific purpose to separate off 'knowing how to' cases in order to account for their relevancy to knowledge proper, where it is directly related to truth, i.e., where what is known is to be true. We come to the conclusion that this relevancy is accounted for when this skill or 'knowing how to' yields knowledge or 'knowing that'. We have achieved this purpose by making 'knowing that' and knowing by acquaintance as test-cases of knowledge. 'Knowing how to' is not simply a series of 'knowing thats' There is an element of technique or skill which is missing in other sorts of knowledge. This skill is not merely application cases of certain fixed rules (of the nature of 'knowing that') as Ryle would impress upon us. It means 'knowing

how to' cannot be reduced to 'knowing that' and vice versa, because 'knowing how to' is a method to reach at 'knowing that' and not itself 'knowing that'. Hence, it is not reduction but connection which we wanted to bring to light. This is in such a way that when this link is absent, 'knowing how to' follows its own peculiar logic and consequently the question of truth no longer remains relevant.

We now leave the problem of 'knowing how to' and touch on another problem related to the first condition of knowledge, and which also concern with the second and the third conditions of knowledge already mentioned. We said that in the case of 'I know that p' 'p' must be true. If 'p' turns out to be false then I need to recast my statement as: " I claimed to know that 'p' but I was mistaken. In fact, I did not have knowledge". Some philosophers have been labouring hard to find out such a pure knowledge which cannot be mistaken. Rationalists thought that this certainty can be found only in demonstrative knowledge. This prejudice has been so great that even the British empiricists like Locke and Hume could not take ordinary empirical propositions as constituting knowledge. Not only mathematical and other demonstrative truths but also sense-data, sensations and some inner mental states and feelings were regarded as legitimate candidates for knowledge. This belief also got further strength from the second condition of knowledge that the knower must be sure about what he knows. It was supposed that there is some special surety and satisfaction in demonstrative truth and also in the empirical knowledge of sense-data and of inner mental feelings and states. Again the third condition, namely, there are to be sufficient; good grounds for what is known, further appears to support the above thesis that the real candidates for knowledge are either demonstrative truths or directly and immediately verifiable sensuous or mental data. For demonstrative truths we have 'conclusive' proofs and for immediate sensuous or mental data we do not require any further evidence or proof and that they are all so self-evident. They are, we may say, transparent truths. In some cases of these truths known their denial would lead to self-contradiction, in some other cases as in immediate sensuous experiences like sensations their denials would lead to absurdity. This restriction to knowledge is unwarranted and rationalistic philosophers were misled by their own ideals. 'I know that P' and 'I know x' do not imply that 'p' must only be demonstrative truth and that 'x' must only be our immediately experienced mental or sensuous data, or that further corroboration, proof or evidence must not increase any confidence in the things known when seen from

different angle. They only imply that 'I know that p' entails 'p' (i.e. 'p' is true) and 'I know x' entails that there is an object 'x'. This entailment nowhere shows about the nature of 'p' or 'x' whether they are to be demonstrative, axiomatic, sensuous or sense-data like. When we say that 'p' necessarily follows from 'I know that p', the necessity involved is the necessity of the relation of entailment between the premises 'I know that p' and the conclusion, 'p', and not 'p' is necessary or demonstrable proposition. As far as the certainty of the knower is concerned (second condition of knowledge) it is a sheer subjective affair. A knower may be assured of anything; he may have the feeling of satisfaction and certainty about his knowledge. This subjective certainty and undoubtedness may exist irrespective of the nature of the knowledge or what is known. I have full certainty that the book is on the table or that sun will rise tomorrow, whatever the rationalist and sense-data phenomenalist may say. Again my certainty will not increase even if I see the book on the table from different angles or do some other successful experiment to know this fact. I do not require rationalistic proofs or sense-data as proof or conclusive evidence for my certainty. Now as far as the requirement of rationale or reason or proof or evidence for knowledge is concerned, it need not be demonstratively rigorous or of the nature conclusive evidence. Scientific evidences or reasons are quite relevantly satisfactory for the purpose of knowledge. In fact if we go deeper into the problem, then we note that even our trust on demonstrative proofs are in fact based on empirically trustable facts like memory, presence of mind, observation. And even our sense-data may be open to empirical doubts and analysis. Again in certain cases one may claim to have knowledge though he may not be able to offer any proof or scientific explanation. One may claim to know events through telepathy. Here there is no question of proof or conclusive evidence which may be demanded by rationalists or phenomenals. Thus I conclude from the above discussion that it is not correct to delimit knowledge only to demonstrative truths or to directly verifiable sensuous or mental infallible data. It also shows that our third condition for knowledge, that the knower has good reasons for what he knows, is not absolute. In the case of parapsychical foreknowledge the knower has no explanation for his knowledge except that his predictions come true.

Let us take belief and try to draw comparisons with knowledge. Extreme or ideal contrast exists when all three conditions, mentioned at the start of this article, stands affirmatively in the case

of knowledge and negatively the case of belief. Besides the three conditions there is a precondition for both knowledge and belief that they must relate to some conscious being. But here there is a difference: knowledge, in contrast to belief, usually belongs to higher power of consciousness. But this may be regarded a matter of degrees. As we noted, there are variety of usages of knowledge, which do not fit properly in the conditions laid down for knowledge. And consequently their contrast with belief also becomes either irrelevant or far-fetched. First we note that there is no such a usage as 'believing how to' as we have 'knowing how to'. There is no such thing 'believing how to cycle' as we have 'knowing how to cycle'. There can be degrees of skill; I may not know quite well how to cycle. But this is not a matter of degrees of the strength of certainty or belief; it is a matter of quantity as to how much one knows and not about the nature of knowing. 'Knowing how much' can obviously be reduced to 'knowing that'. Knowing how much cloth is required for a suit means knowing that so many metres of cloth is required. But corresponding to 'knowing how to' there is no such thing as 'believing how to'.

Secondly, there is no believing by acquaintance which may stand in comparison with 'knowing by acquaintance'. When I say: "I believe you", I only mean that I believe what you say or express yourself in other ways. This means 'I believe you' is in fact reducible to believing that. Or I may also mean to say that I trust you somehow or I have faith in you. In such a case my assertion 'I believe you' is reducible to 'believing in' just as in religious language I say 'I believe in God'. It means we do not have a parallel in the concept of believing with the 'knowledge by acquaintance. Again, we do not have a concept of 'knowing in'. Knowledge in general may combine with 'believing in' in the same person, viz. knower and believer in with respect to the same proposition. The real comparison lies between 'knowing that' and 'believing that' to which we return.

It is sometimes asserted that as the difference between 'knowing that' and 'believing that' is just a matter of degrees, the former may be reduced to the latter in certain cases when the latter approaches to the former to its extreme side of the scale. That is: when the belief is correct (-cf. first condition of knowledge), when we are absolutely sure about our belief (-cf. second condition of knowledge), and lastly when we have conclusive reason for holding our belief (-cf. third condition of knowledge), then the 'believing that'

may be equated with 'knowing that' or that the former amounts to

the latter. In short justified true belief is knowledge. My objection to above equation of knowledge with true justified belief is that in several instances of 'knowing that' as already pointed out we may not have any explanation or proof or evidence i.e. the third condition is lacking. Hence 'knowing that' cannot in a straight fashion be equated with 'believing that' having the above characteristics. Thus the equation at most may be said to be applicable in cases where the question of reasonableness or inference is there. My other objection is based purely on logical analysis. In the case of 'knowing that' we can say: I (or he) thought that I (or he) knew that p, but was mistaken. But we cannot say without awkwardness in the case of 'believing that': I (or he) thought that I (or he) believed that p, but was mistaken. And let in both cases the speaker is both fully justified and convincingly sure, and let 'p' is as a matter of fact true. Thus knowing and believing cannot be equated. The reason is that 'knowing that' is conceptually related to the objective truth. 'Believing that' on the other hand is conceptually related to our subjective attitude or faith and is not necessarily connected with the objective truth. There is related logical point in the analysis of the concepts 'knowledge' and 'belief'. In the first person singular I cannot say without absurdity that 'I know 'p' but I may be mistaken' for the obvious reason that when I am completely sure how can I make a statement with doubts. Likewise in the first person singular I cannot say without absurdity, " I believe with complete confidence that 'p' but may be mistaken ". But here absurdity is of different kind. Here the absurdity emerges out of my commitment. I think, this logical difference between knowledge and belief betrays the real difference between the two. Belief has practical implication. If I have belief that it is going to rain, I would like to take effective steps towards warding off the dangers because of the apprehension of rain. I will adopt a certain attitude and I will plan my course of action keeping in view my belief. Belief inclines me to behave in a certain way. This sort of relation seems to be missing in the case of knowing. When I say, 'I know' or 'He knows', the knower may be completely disinterested, but in the case of believing the person believing cannot remain completely disinterested. When adopting a certain attitude and hence having practical implications the knower becomes believer as well.

Professor Edmund L. Gettier in his well-known article entitled " Is justified true Belief ?" * also argues against equating
Analysis 23:6 (1963) pp. 121-123, Basil Blackwell

knowledge with justified true belief. Although I am not sympathetic towards his arguments, but because of its importance let us examine it. He considers two examples to bring home his point that in certain cases we may have true belief with full justification, still we cannot be said to have knowledge. Suppose Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford. Smith then correctly infers that either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston, although Smith has no idea about Brown's whereabouts. It just happens to be that Brown is in Boston and that Jones does not own a Ford as he happens to be using a rented car. In such a situation Jones cannot be said to know the above entailed proposition, though he is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford and about its entailment. Obviously in this example (as well as in his other example) Gettier thrives on the definition of disjunction (and conjunction) as we accept in truth functional logic. But the so-called logical constants of disjunction (\vee) and conjunction (\cdot) lose the contextual character of lingual connectives of a 'and' and 'either-or'. In real logical entailment (and not in material implication or strict implication) the content (meaning) and form are one and inseparable. In real lingual (and hence logical) connectives like 'either-or' and 'and' both disjuncts or alternants or and both conjunction convey senses with each other's help and are somehow connected together in some contextual background (that is they are not wholly "extensional"; logic with genuine entailment relation cannot be so). So symbolism mislead us and Professor Gettier was able to play the tricks. Hence in language the logical conjunction is sometimes given by 'and', sometimes by 'but', sometimes in punctuation like full-stop, comma, colon, semicolon etc; etc. For the same reason lingual disjuncts are not disjointed and irrelevant to each other----we don't say: either I swim or $2+2=4$ and draw logical conclusions from it. In the Gettier's above example the entailed disjunctive proposition is not derivable in ordinary language because the two disjuncts have not connection or conceptual affiliation with each other. The same comments apply to Gettier's second example where conjuncts are unconnected with each other. So I hold although Gettier's arguments are faulty, justified true belief cannot be equated with knowledge for the logical reasons mentioned by me earlier. However, there is some deductive connection between the concepts of knowledge and belief. If one has knowledge of p, he cannot consistently disbelieve it.

SENSE AND NO-SENSE THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES

The Philosophy of Language exhibits two main notions of proper names; let the first notion be symbolized by PN- and the second one by - PN*. For present purposes, PN and PN* are the arbitrary symbols to refer to *no-sense* and *sense* notions of proper names. The quest of this paper consists in exploring the similitudes rather than contrasts, in contrast of the view that PN is a rebuttal of PN* and PN totally discards PN*

Frege and Kripke both have philosophical systems, having a definite program and goal for their academic journey and destination. In both, Fregean and Kripkean systems, call system F and system K respectively, the notion of proper name plays a central role. For instance, the system F could not be completed without distinguishing a "concept" from an "object", "object" from "function", "concept" from "function," and "sense" from "reference". In all these distinctions, "proper name" is a key notion which cannot be precluded; otherwise, system F would not only lack the significance, but also might not have survived. The concept of a proper name of system F is being recognized by PN*. It relates and coexists with the other concepts, such as "concept," "function," and "object" in a meaningful way.

In system K, the role of proper names is not less significant. There are basically three notions about names and objects, namely "Naming", "Identity"; and "Necessity". The system K utilizes some concepts such as Rigid Designator, transworld-Identity and Necessity, and a priority. All these notions are meaningless if the notion of proper name is being divorced from K.

Precisely, this is an attempt to show that (1) Frege's early writings do exhibit a Kripkean style notion of proper name, (2) Kripke's attribution of the theory of definite description to Frege is a misrepresentation, and finally, (3) a synthesis of PN and PN* would

give us a more comprehensive and plausible account of proper names.

I

In the early phase of Frege's writings, there was hardly a distinction between PN and PN*. The first time that Frege introduces the notion of a name in his *Begriffsschrift* (1879) is in the connection of Equality of Content. The names A and B can be conjoined by the sign of equality if they have the same conceptual content. In the example of a rotational diameter, B, along the circumference of a circle coincides with A, so that both the names have the same content.

(i) $(A = B)$

This proposition tells us first, that the names A and B refer to the same conceptual content and second, that the conceptual content of A and B remains unchanged in the case of mutual replacement of A and B. Third, the invariant portion of the sentence under a replacement is named function, and the replaceable part as the argument of the function. Here, the equality of relation is not between signs or names, but rather between conceptual contents (or object). Notice that, in *Begriffsschrift*, Frege does not introduce the notion of sense in the account of name. It appears for the first time, in "Function and Concept" in 1891.

In *Grundlagen* (1884), Frege beautifully identified a proper name in the context of number. The sign "One" is introduced as a proper name of an object of mathematics which does not allow plurality. (4;59). The nature of a number as well as of a proper name has been determined in the context of a sentence in which it occurs. He treats numbers as object. The objects are the right kind of things for identity relation. The "a" and "b" are the names and stand for the object, "a=b" holds. The word "one" is being associated with the objects which are one in nature, for instance, God. The notion of an identity, a one, and an object are inseparable. Moreover, it provides a criterion of class membership of objects. In addition, the unique role and nature of "one" symbolizes the uniqueness of proper name too. What is meant by a name? He explains in the context of a proposition.

(ii) "All whales are mammals."

Apparently this proposition concerns animals and discerns concepts, but we don't know what kind of animals they are - even if someone were to bring a whale before us, we cannot infer that the animal before us is a mammal. Infact, we need an additional premise that can tell us "it is a whale". As a principle, Frege asserts, "It is impossible to speak of an object without in some way designating or naming it". (4;60). Notice here that Frege clearly introduces a notion of "designation" and equates it with "naming." The "Naming" of an object is a process of designation." (4;61).

Kripke invents a notion of "rigid designator" in order to characterize proper names. For him, a rigid designator must designate to the same object in all possible worlds. (5;48). The name "Nixon" designates rigidly only a person in every situation.

Frege seems to endorse Schroder's notion of names and refine it further.

He quotes:

"So soon, that is, as we picture an object complete - with all its properties and in all its relation, it will present itself as unique in the universe, and there will no longer be anything to match it. The name of the object takes on at once the character of a proper name (*nomen proprium*), and the object itself cannot be thought of as one which is found more than once. But observe that this holds good not only of concrete objects, but generally". (emphasis added).

First of all, Frege observes "what is true in this account is wrapped up in misleading language, that we are obliged to straighten it out and sort the wheat from the chaff." (4;63). The role of general concept is assigned to signify a concept and it can be done when these concepts are conjoined either with definite articles or demonstrative pronouns. Then they can be counted as proper names of things as Frege is identifying the concepts of general nature and proper names designating to objects. Hence, he is introducing a notion of a definite description and a proper name. He further clarifies that

(iii) "The name of a thing is a proper name." (4;64).

(iv) "An object is not found more than once." (4;64).

The (iii) reflects that there is a designating relation between a proper name and an object once an object is named, it must be designated rigidly by the proper name. In addition, the assertion (iv) indicates clearly that Frege was having something in mind similar to the notion of a possible world. He is elucidating that once an object is named, it should be picked out every time in all situation, by the same name. He uses the phrase "complete determination" for it.

How I see Schroder's passage is given in the following:

(i) An object is to be identified by its properties, relations, and uniqueness of unmatchable character.

Kripke also identifies an object by its properties. He says, "when we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed." (5;48)

(ii) The object characterised in (i) would be named and cannot be thought of otherwise. It would be a specific and a concrete object with a rigid name.

This is what Kripke describes rigid designation, "a designation rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever that object exists; if, in addition, the object is a necessary existent." (5;49).

(iii) It allows definite description to refer to an object of a kind if that description is obtained through abstractions and that abstraction is sufficient to determine the object in question completely.

Frege, as mentioned above, adds one more requirement that abstracted concepts must be conjoined with either a definite article or a demonstrative pronoun. It is obvious that this position does not entail that the meaning of a proper name is the definite description. Thus, there are only two ways to refer to an object - either through

proper names or through a definite description if they fulfill the requirement as mentioned above. For Example, the reference of white house can be fixed either by the "White House," the name, or by appropriate (in accords to (iii)) definite description. "The white building serving as residence of the president of the United States in Washington, D.C." The definite description can be more specified by adding exact location of the White House in Washington. Frege is not committed that "white house" means "the white house building of the president of the United States in Washington" as Kripke inaccurately attributes to Frege, but rather it is used to determine the object in question. For Frege, proper names are not abbreviations of definite descriptions, as Russell holds. Presumably, Kripke should accept this version of definite description because he himself uses definite description for fixing the reference of a proper name, but denies the meaning fixation. (5;57). Although he extends his notion of rigid designation to the term of natural kinds (or general terms), such as "tiger", "water", "pain", "election", "gold", etc., these terms are similar to proper names in the sense that they do designate their referents rigidly. Moreover, he uses the definite description for gold, such as "the substance of atomic number of 79" in order to fix its referent.

Frege takes a somewhat similar view when he says that "the number of Jupiter's moons" signifies the same object as the word "four." (4;69). In the next line, Frege makes the issue a bit complicated:

"No more is there in the name "Columbus" anything about discovery or about America, yet for all that it is the same man that we call Columbus and the discoverer of America." (4;69).

The addition of "the discoverer of America" seems to contradict this passage. Either it is a result of an omission, or, if it is deliberate then it signals a change in his position. However, as we have seen there is some evidence to conclude that Frege was entertaining a theory of names of Kripkean style. The above quoted phrases from *Grundlagen* indicate that he acknowledged the fact that a proper name designates an object forever. So far, he did not introduce his notion of sense and reference.

II

Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* does not seem to take Frege's account of proper names very seriously. The obvious example is the attribution of a description theory of names to Frege. (It does not mean that Frege denies that, but rather that he claims something more) His main contribution generally is considered to be his distinction between 'sense' and 'reference.' Kripke doesn't take the trouble to discuss the sense theory of proper names; instead, he concentrates on only one issue, mainly, definite description. Moreover, Kripke's style of bracketing Frege and Russell in most of the references would not be acceptable for a simple reason. Frege and Russell differ significantly in their accounts of a proper name. Russell regards proper names as "disguised" or "truncated" descriptions, while Frege does not. Russell seems to hold that the meaning of a proper name can be given in terms of definite description, but Frege does not accept it. However, Frege is in agreement with Russell that the logical behaviour of a proper name and a definite description in a sentence is identical, because both make a similar contribution in order to determine the truth-conditions of that sentence.

Frege does hold the referent of the proper name, such as "Aristotle," and the definite description, such as "the teacher of Alexander the Great", is identical, but not the sense¹. He illustrates that "the morning star" and "the evening star" stand for the same object (same referent) but they differ in sense.

Dummett rightly observes that Kripke attributes to Frege a version of a theory of proper names which states that proper names are definite descriptions. Admittedly, Frege does give a flavor of it; however, it would be unfair to conclude that he was committed to description theory. We should interpret him in his broader perspective of thought. From this point of view, the obscurities in the text should be interpreted consistently.

1. A common source of confusion is due to Frege's usage of terms. If we use "meaning" for *Bedeutung*, then our sentence would be: The meaning of "Aristotle" is identical with the meaning of "the teacher of Alexander." I believe Kripke understands *Bedeutung* as *sinn*. That is why he only acknowledges "meaning" of a proper name, but not reference in Frege. In this paper, I shall use only sense (*sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*), and avoid the use of "meaning."

Dummett's commentary and analysis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity is fascinating, but in one respect, out of proportion.² He touches almost every aspect of Kripke's account in defence of Frege. I shall deal with some of the objections Dummett raises, relevant to my paper. Before that, it seems appropriate to shed some light on Kripke's views.

The main problem before Kripke was: how does a term (or proper name) get its referent? He thought, first, that definite description or cluster of descriptions of names do not refer to their referents because the description(s) of a term may change in counterfactual situations. He says if "Aristotle" means "the man who taught Alexander the Great", then this description of the name "Aristotle" may only generate a tautology such as "Aristotle was an Aristotle" or Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great". But, in fact, it is not something we could discover to be false. Secondly, we may know several characteristics about Aristotle, but every characteristic or property would be a contingent expression; that is, Aristotle might have other characteristics too. Hence, being the teacher of Alexander the Great may not be the meaning of the name "Aristotle"; these definite descriptions mostly fail to refer an object in all possible counterfactual situations. (5;28-30).

Dummett's argument in order to show an inherent difficulty in Kripkean argument goes like this: According to Kripke, one might hold that the following statement is true:

- (v) "The man who taught Alexander might have not taught Alexander" ;

but it would be wrong to assert that

- (vi) The man who taught Alexander didn't teach Alexander".

Further, Kripke holds

- (vii) "The teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander",

² He devotes only 29 pages for chapter 5, but he discusses Kripke in 42 pages in the appendix.

and

(viii) "Aristotle" might not have been Aristotle. Dummett is arguing here that if (viii) is false in the modal context using proper name, and (vi) is false using definite description, then why are (v) and (vii) not false? But Kripke would argue that most of the things we attribute to Aristotle might have turned out to be false. In that situation he did not do them. This is the force of his argument, that the definite description we use can't work in some situations. But it is not the case with names. Kripke accepts Dummett's plea that there are circumstances in which the teacher of Alexander. However, he says it is not true that "Aristotle might not have been Aristotle, although Aristotle might not have been called "Aristotle", just as 2×2 might not have been called "four". (5;62).

Dummett does not have a really strong argument to conclude that no distinction appears between a proper name and definite description in the modal context. (2;114-15). Now, he considers another example to show the ambiguity in terms of possibility and necessity. Kripke assumes that "St. Anne" is a proper name and "The mother of Mary" is a definite description. He shows that the two are not synonymous. If it is true that there was a woman Mary and there was a parent. But it is not clear whether the person named "St. Anne" was her mother. Hence, it is not necessary true that if there was such a woman as "St. Anne", she was a parent. It is quite possible that she may have died in infancy, etc. Thus, the definite description can't be the meaning of "St. Anne". (2;112). Dummett says,

After all, even though there is an intuitive sense in which it is quite correct to say, 'St. Anne might never have become a parent,' there is also an equally clear sense in which we may rightly say, 'St. Anne cannot but have been a parent,' provided always that this is understood as meaning that, if there was such a woman as St. Anne, then she can only have been a parent. Kripke indeed acknowledges that such a sense

exists, although not in connection with personal proper name". (2;113).

Now, why should Kripke not accept it? It does not seem to defeat Kripke's argument. The point Kripke is making is this: the motherhood or parenthood of "St. Anne" is a contingent property. It might be true. It might not be true. If it is correct, then the thesis that the meaning of proper name is definite description is being refuted.

Kripke makes a distinction between proper name and definite description via a rigid designator, which is merely a term standing for some specific and same object in all counterfactual situations wherever that object exists. According to this criterion, "Moses" is rigid designator, but the definite description "the man who led the Jewish people out of Egypt" is not. There might have been some situation in which somebody other than Moses led the Jewish people. Kripke holds that fixing the reference does not imply fixing the meaning of the term in question.³

Dummett proposes that in order to make "rigid designator" a useful notion, the metaphor of a possible world must be given up. In what sense is the notion of a possible world a metaphor? Dummett does describe its reason; he says "the meaning of a term would have to be a function defined over some or all possible worlds whose value for any possible world was an object in that world; the worlds for which it was defined would be those in which the term had no reference". (2;127). For him, the connotation of a proper name may function over some or all possible worlds as partial constant function. (2;127). I suppose Dummett is saying that, irrespective of proper name or definite description, or rigid and non-rigid designators, every term acquires some meaning (connotation) when it refers to an object either in one world or another. Therefore, we don't need any more notion of possible world. Immediately, a question arises: Is there no alternative way to maintain the notion of rigid designation on one hand, and attaching the sense on the other, instead of removing the metaphor? What is the notion of a possible world? Kripke says it is a mistake to think " . . . possible worlds as something like distant Planet, like our own surroundings but somehow existing in different dimension..." He defines "possible

³ Dummett notices that Kripke never explains his notion of meaning.

worlds" in terms of mathematical probability. The 36 possible states of the dice are literally 36 "possible worlds." Now the actual world in this case is the state of the dice that is actually realized. (5;16). Kripke is holding the view that the referent of a proper name exists somewhere among the many possibilities. Once the name is picked up for its referent, of course, actual world is realized, and hence, it precludes all possibilities of its existence in any domain whatsoever.

Dummett's line of argument seems to show that there is a sense in which one can say that the use of a proper name and a definite description in the modal context generate ambiguities, especially in the case of proper names where, he argues, *de dicto* and *de re* confusion is found, particularly in the example of "St. Anne". The move is to show the inconsistency in the account of rigid designator by showing that there are ambiguities in the usage of proper names in the modal context. Even if we assume that it can be shown that notion of rigid designator is untenable, the problem of sense of proper names remains.

III

Most of the authors on Kripke attribute to him "A casual theory of proper name", although he himself never advanced a theory like this. Nevertheless, he does provide a justification for the no-sense theory of proper name in terms of chain communication, that goes back to the original referent.⁴ Dummett states that when a person is initially baptized, a name is given ostensively.

"Subsequent great speakers use the name with an intention of using it with the reference with which it was originally endowed. Later still, yet other speakers pick up the use of the name . . . This process continues, and so the use of name is passed from link to link of a chain of communication." (2;147-148).

⁴ What is true in case of causal theory, the same is true for no-sense theory of proper name. What leads me to call it by no-sense, is the conviction that it overwhelmingly represents Kripke's intuitions and contrasts with Frege's theory of sense and reference.

His concern is not here to discuss speaker of names or the intentionality of these name-users, but rather to provide the core notion of proper names. The baby who was given a name, later "Aristotle", is Aristotle because his given name rigidly designates him only. The chain communication argument is merely a justification for a question of how we know that the name "Aristotle" stands for Aristotle. The second justification may be given in terms of definite description. The description of Aristotle as so-and-so would help as to apply "Aristotle" to its referent. But in that case too, the description must have been written by someone else, who know Aristotle. Thus, link-explanation does remain crucial in fixing the reference of "Aristotle". Kripke would not be comfortable with the view that fixing the reference of "Aristotle" implies fixing the meaning of "Aristotle". Frege, in my view, is not doing this. His notion of meaning, more accurately, sense, is not commonsensical. As we understand it, "astronomy" means "the scientific study of universe" Aristotle means the teacher of Alexander the Great". The first problem is how to identify a name. The identification issue is being linked with the distinction between an object and a concept (or a function). According to Frege, all linguistic expressions normally take the form of argument and function; in other words, the expressions are either the names of objects or the names of functions. The names of objects are proper names. So, any term, expression, and even a sentence, may be characterized as an object if it occupies the place of an argument of a sentence and if some proper name refers to, or stands for, that object. The proper name in an ordinary sense, such as "Aristotle", "Kripke", and ordinary definite description such "the teacher of Alexander the Great", may logically behave in the same way if they occur in the argument place and stand for the same object. The reference of a proper name, definite description, or particular term must be an object.

Frege holds that a sentence refers to its Truth-Value. If we strictly follow Frege's terminology, then we are led to a very complicated and sensitive point. The natural conclusion is that the sentence is proper name and its Truth-Value is the referent (or an object). The simple formula is, the object is what an expression stands for. Or, conversely, if an expression refers, it must refer to an

object. Although Frege's mutual reflective criterion seems oversimplified, because it surprisingly reduces objects to linguistic entities and vice versa.

Before discussing the sense of a proper name, let's recall the previous discussion. According to that elucidation of an object and a proper name, the notion of an object seems to be the significant point of departure because in Kripke's program, objects are physical and concrete. It might be an appropriate attempt to give an interpretation of Frege which can permit expressions, including numbers, to behave like objects when they are appropriately designated by some other linguistic entities, especially by proper name. But this interpretation should not allow objects to become linguistic entities.

Now, consider Kripke's main thesis. It requires that a proper name must designate rigidly to an object, it must be communicated through a causal chain, and once it is realized, it must preclude the existence of the bearer of that name in a counterfactual situation.

Intuitively, first, it seems to me that this notion of proper name is not in conflict with Fregean notion of a proper name. Therefore, this feeling encourages us to hold the view that a supplement of a sense to rigid designation would not be incompatible with an overall Kripkean program. For instance, "Aristotle" is undoubtedly a proper name, according to PN and PN*, the only problem remains about the "the teacher of Alexander". Assume that "the teacher of Alexander" is a proper name, as Frege holds, or any sign indicated by quotation marks. " " is a proper name and rigidly designates Aristotle; furthermore, assume that there is a chain history about " " and it always refers to Aristotle in all possible worlds. And if it has turned out that Aristotle has another name "Aristotle", in that case, "Aristotle" would be necessarily identical to " ". No doubt the fact about the identity of names is an empirical fact, but the relation between them would be of necessity. From the same token, Kripke should accept this fact that if "the teacher of Alexander" is a sign of some kind and rigidly designates only Aristotle, a causal link is established and that causal chain tells us that "the teacher of Alexander" refers to Aristotle, as in the above case " " does. Then we can conclude that "the teacher of Alexander" = "Aristotle" if it turns out both signs - i.e. "Aristotle" and "the teacher of Alexander" - refer to the same object, i.e., Aristotle. The point I am making here

is this: we cannot rule out the circumstances in which a definite description might have met the requirements for a proper name. It does not mean that the sense of a proper name is a definite description. Instead, the definite description is itself a proper name, or a collection of four words "the - teacher - of - Alexander" is a proper name.

Frege illustrates that two expressions having different senses may refer to the same object. "The morning star" and "the evening star" refer to the same object, the planet named Venus, but they differ in sense. Thus, the sense of "Aristotle" is distinct from the sense of "the teacher of Alexander". From this elucidation, we understand two things. First, Kripke's repudiation of "Aristotle" means "the teacher of Alexander" was mistaken because Frege never held this view explicitly. Second, the sense of one proper name or singular term is not identical with the sense of another proper name even if both refer to the same object. In other words, association of sense with proper names does not imply association of definite description with names. Contrary to that, it does say that the sense of a proper name and sense of a definite description must be different. Of course, the sense of "Aristotle" and sense of "the teacher of Alexander" in identity statement such as "Aristotle" = "the teacher of Alexander" is different; however, both refer to the same object.

There is another similarity between Frege and Kripke which emerges when we consider their views concerning the problem of fixing the reference of proper name. Kripke holds that if there is an essential property of an object then it must be true of that object where that object would have existed. (5;48). And if that object is to be referred to by its bearer, then that bearer should refer to the object through its essential properties. It can't be done unless some expression describes the properties which would have to be true. Particularly in the case of natural kind term, Kripke ties up rigid designation with the essential properties. Of course, Kripke is not as candid as Frege is, concerning Truth-Value of the expressions, but one can sense this feature from his talk of essential properties of an object named. And that relation between an object and properties must hold as true.(5;57). Otherwise, reference cannot be fixed. Kripke does not prescribe any method to determine the Truth-Value directly. This might be the reason that his orientation of semantics

indeed appeals to commonsense intuition. Nevertheless, Frege's method is rooted in his formal and logical systems.

Frege characterizes a reference of a sentence by its Truth-Value. Suppose

(1) The morning star is a body illuminated by the sun;

(2) The evening star is a body illuminated by the sun.

(3;62)

The propositions (1) and (2) refer to the same object because both share the same Truth-Value and Truth-Value is being determined by the role the singular terms play in determining the Truth-Value. But (1) and (2) differ in sense.

The identity relation between "the morning star" and "the evening star" holds if we know that both the expressions refer to the same object, namely Venus, but "the morning star" and "the evening star" do differ in a sense, because they differ in cognitive value. Notice that Kripke also talks about the identity statement, such as

"Herperus = Phosphorus"

This is necessarily true and is to be known empirically. The Truth-Value of the identity statements, in both cases, relies upon the cognitive information.

In the Kripkean system, identity relation is not only a posteriori, but necessity in a metaphysical sense. Once it is established that "Herperus" and "Phosphorus" refer to the same planet, the relation must hold. Frege acknowledges different senses in "Herperus" and "Phosphours" because both proper names do have the same cognitive value, but that has to be determined differently. I observe that if the sense-aspect is being introduced to Kripkean notion of a proper name, on the one hand, the notion of a rigid designation would remain intact, and on the other hand, a more comprehensive notion of a proper name would be generated.

According to Aristotle, the denotation and connotation of terms increase and decrease respectively and inversely. The increase in the denotation results in the decrease of the connotation of that term. Moreover, we know that Frege and Kripke both partially

accept Millian account. Kripke endorses the denotative aspect and Frege accepts the connotative one. More precisely, Kripke acknowledges that proper names denote and do not connote, while Frege acknowledges that the singular terms connote. This is the general understanding, but I feel it is not fair, at least in the case of Frege. He accepts both- a term of a proper name captures two dimensions, a denotative and a connotative one. At this point, Dummett is perfectly right that Frege's "sense" theory reflects what connotation they tell. (2;132-33).

Kripkean response would be like this: if we attribute sense to a proper name in terms of connotation, it implies that a name user must know about the bearer of that name. For instance, one should know what "Godel Theorem" is like if he/she is using it to refer to something. Dummett feels that it is a hard requirement in the sense that it would consequently follow that a person cannot refer to a city because he/she does not know about that city, say, Tokyo. Surely, Frege would not approve of that sort of sense attached to a proper name. (2;138). It means that a person should know about "Tokyo", concerning its streets, industries, markets, population, area, and so on. Dummett proposes that that person should have at least sufficient information about the city so that he/she can correctly identify the object named as "Tokyo". Hence, the connotative aspect of proper name theory does not or should not require a complete comprehension of all the properties the bearer of that name possesses. (2;137). When somebody says "Taj Mahal"; at least he knows that it is a symbol of love and beauty, although he does not know too much else about it. As soon as a proper name is uttered, it not only denotes its bearer, but also conveys some sense. That is the sense Frege talks about.

He demonstrates that the sense of "the morning star" differs from the sense of "the evening star" even though both singular terms refer to the same object. Indeed, it makes sense, because the sense of "morning" and "evening" differ; however, the sense of "star" is common in both expressions. Here, again, the Fregean principle is applicable which says that the sense of an expression is determined by the sense of its constituents. Hence, the sense of "the evening star" and the sense of "the morning star" must be different.

Kripke frequently uses an example of the " $H_2O = \text{Water}$ " and holds that " H_2O " and "Water" are rigid designators. He regards the

natural kind terms "Water" and "H₂O" refer to the same substance, but don't have any sense. It is easy to understand that "Water" refers to water, but I don't see how "H₂O" can refer to water, knowing this fact that "H₂O" is a molecular structure of the combination of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. When a person utters "H₂O" or "Hcl" or "Nacl", he does not refer to corresponding substances, rather he refers to chemical elements or chemical compounds. Nobody asks for "H₂O" when one needs a cup of water. Not only that, both names \in "H₂O" and "Water" - are generally used on radically different occasions. It is really incomprehensible that they don't possess any sense. Quite contrary, our experience and our communicatory machinery witness against this view. Again, for Kripke, "e = mc²" is a necessary truth, but every student of science knows that the sense of "e" and the sense of "mc²" differ in a very significant way. With these examples, I would like to suggest that a proper name can be understood as having minimum denotation. Such that only one object with maximum characteristics/properties uniquely and rigidly be designated by it. A proper name is one which rigidly designates only one specific object in all possible worlds if that object possesses all essential properties, maximally.

In the first section, I tried to show that Frege had a similar notion of rigid designator to Kripke in his early work, particularly in *Grundlagen* (section 50-52), where he explicitly characterizes proper name as a name of a thing in all possible worlds. (see (3) and (4)). His implicit endorsement to Schroder's view further strengthens our belief. Although it was not so crystalized as Kripke presents. In the next section, I have discussed that Kripke does not touch the Fregean main claim that a proper name refers to its bearer via its sense. Although Kripke's argument against this view that proper names mean definite descriptions seems powerful, it is pointless. Dummett admits that we cannot give the sense of a proper name in terms of definite description, but he tries to show that Kripke's notion of rigid designation is obscure because counterexamples demonstrate that the usage of proper names and definite descriptions is not different in the modal context. I have observed that Dummett's criticism of Kripke is not well directed. In the final section, I tried to pin down the basic error in the no-sense theory of proper names and suggested that a synthesis of Fregean and Kripkean views would bring about a more comprehensive and plausible account of proper names.

In short, in my judgement, Kripke's account of proper names lacks a significant feature of the sense which has been envisioned by Frege.

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THE MIRACLES AND THE RATIONALIST MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS

Philosophy is the search for truth. It has rightly been said that man is a metaphysical animal. Al-Kindi was the first creative philosophical writer in Islam who explored the place of reason and faith in religion objectively. He was the first Muslim Philosopher who gave science its due consideration without devaluing religion. He was a scientist, philosopher and sincere Muslim who interpreted religion in the light of his scientific and philosophical knowledge. His approach was based on rational investigation through which he tried to prove an accord between philosophy and religion. According to him philosophy depends on reason, while religion on revelation. Logic is the method of philosophy, while faith is the way of religion which depends upon the realities mentioned in the Quran, revealed by God to the Prophet. He considered theology as a part of philosophy and believed that philosophical inquiry and Divine revelation received by Prophet Muhammad and fundamental Islamic belief can be demonstrated syllogistically.¹ He strongly believed in the orthodox view of creation, EX NIHILO. God is thus the sustainer of all that he has created. He alone is eternal. He believed in the unity of God and proved the existence of God with the help of teleological arguments.

1. Fakhry, Majid; A History of Islamic Philosophy. London, pp. 76-78 & SHARIF, M.M; (ed) A History of Muslim Philosophy. P.425.

According to Al-Kindi, in philosophy human knowledge of particular and material things is gained through sense perception. This field comes under physics, while understanding and immaterial knowledge is obtained through rational cognition, which is the domain of meta-physics.

The rational attitude started by him was later supported by other Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Ibn-Scna, Ibn-i-Tufayal 'Ibn-i-Bajjah etc, etc, all believed in the identical nature of philosophical and revelational truth.

Al-Farabi adopted a moderate attitude towards the superiority of reason and revelation. His view about God combines both, Aristotle's First cause (not accessible to human reason) and God in religion. He believed in miracle as super-natural which works according to natural law. Prophets' having supernatural powers are associated with the celestial world from where the terrestrial world is managed. This relation and communication enables them to perform acts, called supernatural. It is through this communication that the prophet causes rain to fall, the moon to split asunder, the stick to be transformed into a snake or the blind and leperous to be healed. Al-Farabi like stoics tried to reduce to causality, matters beyond the habitual course of nature and even contradictory to it.² He fully believed in causality and determinism and referred to cause even for those effects which have no apparent causes. He favours sciences, advocates experimentation and denies augury and astrology. He elevates the intellect to such a high and sacred place where he could reconcile it with tradition, so that philosophy and religion may be got in accord.³

2. Al Thamarat Al Mardiyah; Fi-Blad Al Risalat Al-Farabiyyah, Leiden, 1890 and SHARIF, M.M.;(ed) "A History of Muslim Philosophy" P.466.

3. Ibid. p. 468.

Imam Ghazali also believed in the creation of the world by God, EX NIHILO at a particular time. He considered philosophers as wrong when they applied the analogy of human knowledge to Divine knowledge. The Philosophers have failed in proving the fundamental doctrine of God's Providence and Omnipotence on the basis of the theory of causation and its logical necessity. He refutes the reign of inexorable causal necessity, which pervades the entire scheme of things. In "Tahafat", he asserts the reason that the relation between cause and effect is not a logical entailment and necessity but rather of a psychological necessity with no contradiction. So miracles of the prophets mentioned in the Quran are not logically impossible. His main difference with philosophers is in their sole reliance on reason for obtaining the truth.⁴ Ghazali considers reason as important and essential in all matters other than religion. His only objection is that like Greek Philosophers Muslim philosophers are also applying reason in religious matter and that is not correct.

Ibn-i-Rushd gave importance to reason, his system though seems contrary to Ghazali's, is in fact the progressive stage of rationalizing process, where different opinions are rationalistically synthesized. His rationalistic attitude, considering the identical nature of philosophical and revelational truth, has its effects on the later Muslim thought. He proved his view with reference to Quran, where it directs the Muslims to use their reason.

By reason and science Ibn-i-Rushd meant the knowledge of causes. His two views, the theory of causation and the relation of philosophy and science to religion was not given any importance by muslim thinkers for a long time. In 19th century the challenge of modern science and society led Muslim thinkers especially Sheikh

4. Ghazali, A.H., "Al-Munqidh Min Ad-Dalal".

Muhammad Abduh, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Ameer Ali to rely on Rushdian lines.

MYSTICISM IN INDO-PAK SUB-CONTINENT

Another prominent thought system which dominated from 13th to 17th century was mysticism, found among Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, Jews and Muslims with some similarities. In the early stages mysticism and sufism adhered to temperance and piety and showed rationalistic explanation of reality. In the second stage of sufism the ascetic tendencies developed into pantheistic trend. In the third stage, Ghazali started in systematizing the sufistic methodology. He criticised the rational faculty of Greek philosophy, and synthesised the truthfulness and usefulness of both orthodox and sufistic points of view into sufistic metaphysics in "MISHKAT AL-ANWAR". According to him human power of apprehension starts with senses, develops in reason which through inference and synthesis expands and reaches a high level. The knowledge of things that prophets and saints have is not possible through reason, rather through a higher faculty. The highest type of knowledge of God, His attributes and other higher type of knowledge is attained only through this faculty.

In the sub-continent of Indo-Pak sufism with its prominent ethical and moral aspect flourished till seventeenth century. The Hindus and Muslims inspite of living together retained their separate identities in all spheres of life, yet the interaction did involve mutual effect to some extent. The mughal Emperor Akbar tried at uniting the two nations, but failed. The result was Muslim identity crises, because among Hindus Pantheism prevailed and Muslim sufism was very much influenced by this sort of mysticism. vis sufism of Wahda-til-Wajood (Pantheism) The Muslim society had to inculcate in themselves all the consequences of this sort of

sufism e.g. fatalistic attitude and worshipping dervais or mystics. A reaction was developed against this sort of religious mystic approach. Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi was the arch-enemy of this sort of sufism. He preached panatheism (پانٲائٲم) against Hindu mysticism. In search of the Muslim identity, many reform movements and rationalistic doctrines were developed, hitting the very basis of sufistic spell of determinism, responsible for moral and practical stagnation of the Muslim.

Sirhindi rejected the sufi point of view of considering sainthood above prophethood. Giving the rationalistic analysis of mystic state of absorption, he proved it as below the state of prophetic experience because the world renounced by the sufis is affirmed at a highest level by the prophet. The spiritual journey when reaches the highest Divine Being, it requires the affirmation of its opposite, the non-being or the world. The saint by despising the world, stops at this stage, he can not move further, while a prophet by affirmation attains the highest stage.

Sheikh Sirhindi gave a rationalistic explanation of miracles. He believes in the causal order of the world. According to him God has given chance and freedom to man to act freely, to realize his own capacities and to understand the meaning and purpose of the creation of the world. At the time when Sheikh Sirhindi started the rationalistic approach of purifying sufism in the sub-continent, in the West the rationalistic movement was in full swing. The later thinkers of the sub-continent had the good opportunity to take advantage of Western modern thinkers and be influenced by them. Yet we see that the later Muslim thinkers of India especially Shah Waliullah retained his isolated identity from Western sources. The constructive purifying movement started by Sheikh Sirhindi in the seventeenth century developed into an organic rationalistic system of

Shah Waliullah in Eighteenth century. After purification of sufism and orthodoxy he synthesized these with jurisprudence

The liberal interpretation of Islam by Shah Waliullah did not flourish due to political instability in India. His successors directed their efforts only towards rehabilitation of political and social state of the Muslims; educational side was ignored. The result was not convincing. The true moral reform could be revived and revitalized with the help and background of modern knowledge and scientific technology of the time which was developed by the west and India was far behind in this respect.

In the eighteenth century Sayyid Ahmad Khan appeared as a social and religious reformer. In his case the Western influences are highly exaggerated because of his brought up in a religious Muslim family and his eastern conservative religious education. After Shah Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan gave new route and expansion to Islamic rationalistic movement with practical struggle and effort. In case of Sayyid Ahmad Khan we see a subtle change because he had faced difficult, highly degrading and depressing situation of the Muslim of sub-continent after the War of Independence. He gave up the idea of Hijrat to Eyp^t and decided to share the troubles of his nation and to work for them. He considered it as his religious duty and national obligation to alleviate them and give them their lost prestige and position.⁵ The revolutionary changes, social and political circumstances had disorganized the spiritual as well as the material life of the Muslims of the sub-continent. There was a complete dead-lock for the Muslims. At this critical cross road of history, there was the attractive materialistic naturalism of the West and the general enlightenment with the introduction of modern scientific knowledge on one side, while on the other side there were doubts, misgivings and several queer notions wrongly ascribed to

5. Hali, Altaf Hussain; Hayat-i-Javid, Lahore Academy Punjab 1966, P-155

Islam. Sayyid Ahmed Khan appeared on the scene at a time when the Muslim umma as a whole, and the Indian Muslims in particular, were morally and religiously despirited. They were under foreign subjugation. It fell to his lot to reason against the view points of Christian Missionaries of the advanced and advancing ruling British people on one hand and to struggle against the un-warranted thoughts, superstitions of Indian Muslims and Muslim clergymen and ulamas on the other. His approach was based on reason and rational investigation of Islamic dogmas, an attempt to understand the Quran and its teaching and to derive practical conclusion for human conduct and improvement of socio-cultural conditions.

RELIGION

Religion is fundamental in human societies. According to Sayyid Ahmad Khan it is inborn in man. Bergson rightly states its inevitable necessity in these words, "We find in the past, we could find today, human societies with neither science nor arts, nor Philosophy. But there has never been a society without religion".⁶

Sayyid Ahmad Khan realized that the reformation and reconstruction of the Muslim society, necessitated a change in the religious attitude of the Muslim with emphasis on reason, understanding and practical principles for human conduct. Religion is innate, natural and rational. It deals with the conduct of man, who is capable of judgement by differentiating good from evil. He stated that

"Of all the innumerable wonders of the universe, the most marvellous is RELIGION. The foundation of which lies in the distinction between the acts of men, distinguishing them into good,

6. Bergson, H; The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, New York, 1954, P.102

evil, indifferent; for , if there be no such difference, there can be no religion, et contra".⁷

He was aware that religious truth is sometimes different from scientific truth, because it is not derived through reason. The religious idea is innate, neither learnt, nor acquired "and is accepted, entertained and acquiesced in, independently of any evidence of its truth through the instrumentality of the external senses".⁸ The influence, force and truth of religion is a universal reality. The heart is its base and belief in it is more certain than in objects perceived.⁹ "Proof of religion being a reality, the very idea of it alone acts upon men's thought and determines men's action with a force.."¹⁰

Man is religious by nature. ¹¹ From the very beginning, the religious idea, the idea of some Power, superior to him, existed in him. The proof is that, "in every age each clan, tribe, and nation, nay, almost each separate individual, formed on idea of religion, or rather of the object of it....."¹²

In primitive time man was incapable of understanding true nature of natural events and considered them as an act of some unseen power. So worship of different sorts began. In due course different religions among different people flourished and every one considered his religion to be true. Sayyid Ahmad Khan referred to Quran where God says, " I am with each individual in the

7. Ahmad khan, Sayyid; "Tasanif-I-Ahmadiya (Aligarh, 1887, P. 183 and Syed Ahmad Khan Bahadar, "A Series of Essay on The Life Of Muhammad And Subject Subsidiary There To". (Lahore. 1968), Preface. P.-3.

8. Abid. Pref. P.3.

9. Pani-Pati Ismail (ed). Maqallat-I-Sir Sayyid, VOL. XIII P. 251

10. Syed Ahmad Khan Bahadar: "A SERIES OF ESSAY ON THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD," Preface P. 3.

11. MAQALAT. Vol.4(M'AZHAB Inshan ka Amer Tabaie Hai),p.²⁶⁰.

12. Ibid - Preface p.3.

appearance which he forms of me in his own mind".¹³ The truths of religion are "primary and independent of man's belief. They are in nature. Nature is a law, and as a law necessarily implies a lawgiver",¹⁴ and so through nature, man looks to -"..... God that supreme and perfect Being upon whom the existence of all other beings originally depends....."¹⁵ He further stresses that, "Man, then, must look through Nature upto Nature's God". Finally he concludes that, "I have found Islam to be most undoubtedly the true religion, that is, its genuine and chief principles are in perfect harmony with that true one which I have defined to be true religion".¹⁶ At another place he expresses, "A true religion is in conformity with human nature and nature in general because God is the Author of nature both in man and outside.....I am fully confident that the guidance which He has given us is absolutely in confirmity with our constitution and our nature and this is the only touchstone of its truth. It would be clearly absurd to assert that God's action is different from His word. All creation including man is the work of God and religion is His Word, so there cannot be any contradiction between the two".¹⁷

In Tahzibul Akhlaq¹⁸ he explained a true and natural religion does not hinder the progress and development of man otherwise there was no necessity or need for creating him. Man is gifted with reason conscience and innate capacities to recognize and worship God. Man has a contradictory principle of good and evil and he has the capacity to subdue the evil. He is created for a noble purpose to

13. Ibid - Preface p.4.

14. Ibid - Preface p.5.

15. Ibid - Preface p.5.

16. Ibid. Preface p.6.

17. Majmuah.. Lecture.pp.21-22. Maqallat'Vol.III p. 199. a'so, "Tafsirul-Quran'Vol.I "usul.p.14

18. Mazzamine Tahzibul Akhlaq Vol.11.,p.159. and 'Maqallat; Vol.XIII.P.40

do the good and avoid the evil. A virtuous life is the only true life of man. Those who have followed the wrong path, have deviated from the true and noble purpose of life.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan tried to reconcile modern scientific spirit with the traditional attitude of Islam. As a true and devoted muslim he could not repudiate the overwhelming superiority of faith to reason. Nor could he deny that scientific knowledge was essential for the community's progress. He tried to reconcile both and showed that religion is not opposed to science. Without religion and faith in God, man is incomplete. Man has supramundane destiny, the attainment of which is possible only through the instrumentality of religion.

In an effort to defend Islam as a religion, he separated the sphere of religion of the Indian Muslim and the temporal matters that is the culture and civilization. Both are different in nature. The religious principles pertain to spiritual conduct, are permanent and final.¹⁹ The spirit of man, created by God does not change during his existence on earth. Quran and the proved traditions of the Prophet are infallible truths, they must be in accordance with the nature. The original and pure Islam i.e. the Quran is the word of God and Nature is His work. They infact are in full accord with each other and cannot contradict each other. There is no change in them.²⁰ He accepted Quran as the final authority in matter of judgment and identified religion in its purest form with the state of nature. His words are "Islam is nature and nature is Islam." True religion consists in belief in one God only, and all those who believe in the unity of God are muslims.²¹

19. Maqalat-i-Sir Sayyid. Vol. v, 'Mazhab aur M's sharat, " pp 5.6 and Imquallat Vol. IX.p.10.

20. Maqallat Vo, p-234 and Majmuas i lectures p.298.

21. Ibid, p.41., and an artcils in Tahzib-al-Akhlaq, Islam is nature and nature is Islam

The ethical principles of Islam are well adapted to human nature, not a single word goes against human nature or capacity, nor any law requires a single thing which man cannot perform. Thus he interprets Islam as a natural religion.²² He then distinguished two types of religious directives. The scriptural directives are directly given to the Prophet himself and the second kind of directives are inferred and deduced from the scriptures, by the scholars and justis according to demands of the age and then our scholarship. Only the second kind of directives are liable to fallacies and mistakes.²³ The temporal matters which deal with the social and cultural values keep on changing with the change of time and circumstances. They can be remodeled, changed or retained according to their utility, need and requirement. Therefore, they cannot be included in the permanent religious values. The result will be unfortunate and destructive. He expressed it in these words "The basis of human misfortune is the mixing of temporal issues with the eternal and unchangable religious issues".²⁴ Anxious to confine religion strictly to spiritual conduct and faith, he stated, "The fact is that from the early days of my early education I had held faith and the world to be the same After much meditation and contemplation, and after understanding the argument for and against, and pondering well on the injunction of God and His apostle, a differenc appeared between the two... I am very pleased to confess and I believe that it is a great mistake not to differentiate between religions and worldly affairs and to treat them equally as religious injunction.²⁵ Differentiating religious commandment from social regulation, while quoting Hadith, he pointed out that the social decadence of the Muslim is due to the wrong conception of including both the religious as well

22. Ibid, pp.213-14 and Tafsir-ul-Quran vo. I p.37

23. Maqallat, Vol. XI, pp. 14 & 15. and Vol. XIII. p.35.

24. Maqallat-i-Sir Sayyid, Vol.V, pp.516.

25. Ahmad Khan, Sayyid, "Tasanif-i-Ahamdia"Part-I, Vol. I.p.136



as the worldly affairs into religion and neglecting the saying of the Prophet, "that you know the worldly affairs better than I."²⁶

Although he himself was not able to keep religion and civilization apart, had he taken this step to its logical end, he would have never discussed the social issue like polygamy, slavery etc, in Quranic Tafsirs, essays and his emphasis that Islam has all those right things which leads to worldly progress, humanity, civilization and kind hearted perfection.²⁷

In this effort his main motive was to purify the sources of religion from unnecessary rituals, irrational dogmas and blind taqlid, to save Islam from the contempt and [ridicule] of other religions, western writers and challenge of materialistic naturalism of the West by proving Islam to be quite inconformity with the reason and basic principles of modern sciences. The important task before him was the true assessment of some religious problems which were ture in themselves. But either they were wrongly interpreted or not expounded in rational terms. To secure this end he reconstructed the original and pure Islam, in which nongenuine elements, influences of Jews, Christians and impact of Greek Weltanschauing were imputed.. His endeavour was to disentangle Quran from the web of myths and fable, miracle mongering and magic, mis-interretation and to restore it to its pure form of divine massage, to guide man by appealing to his reason. In his religious thought he stood for rational approach. He claimed that Islam was a true religion. Quran is the only source of Islamic tenets. His efforts were directed to prove its conformity with the rational stand point of the scientific age.

GOD

26. Maqalat-i-Sir Sayhid, "Vol. IX. pp. 4 and 10. and Vol. XIII.p.37

27. Fazal Din. (ed) "Mazamine". p-173

Belief in God is the life-blood of religion. Sayyid Ahmad Khan expressed his view in these words, "It is axiomatic that there exists a God, who created the universe. He is one, independent, unbegotten and unbecoming. He is necessary, self-existent, undying and eternal. He is the cause of causes of the entire creation as it ever was and it ever will be" 28 The beginning of all creation is God. God has created every thing including matter. But why has God created the universe, what was the purpose of all creation and what was His first creation, is beyond the reach and comprehension of human being because of his limited knowledge. Man only knows this much that God

is the first creator as it is proved by the Holy Quran, that beginning of all creation is the utterance of the word "Be" by Him.²⁹

The divine attributes are identical with the Divine Essence. The divine attributes are promordial, eternal and their manifestation is a necessity innate in the Essence for ever. He is existing (maujud) and so self-existent (wajib-al-wajud).³⁰ The rationalist and philosophers under Hellenic influence (علماء منكمبين) regard divine attributes as neither essence itself, nor other than it, while theologians considered them as essence itself and their manifestation a necessity innate in essence. Sayyid Ahmad Khan considers both views as merely a verbal altercation. He seemed to be inclined towards the later view, He states that the former view is not supported by conclusive arguments.³¹ The belief in God's unity, His omnipotence and Omniscience are common among all muslim, the difference is in the nature of the attributes of God. Agreeing with Mutazilites and Philosophers, He believes that God's attributes are identical with his essence, on the other hand, like theologian He believes in all positive and negative attributes of the Divine Essence mentioned in Quran as true, but considers them beyond human comprehension, only derivative meaning can be attained. He believes in the unity of God, but denies the beautiful vision either in this world or in the hereafter, but admits the possibility of spiritual sight only after death, different from the physical sight.³² He also

28. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, "Tahreer fi-usul-i-Tafseer" in Tafsir-ul-Quran Vol.I. Lahore. RAfa aum steam Press. Usul. I. p.3.

29. Tahzeeb-ul-Akhlaq Vol.II, p.184.

31. Usul. 7, p.5.

30. Maqallat. Vol.III. P-266.

32. Tahzibul Akhlaq, Vol.II, p-170.

agrees with philosophers on the cosmological proof of the existence of God, that He is the ultimate or first causeless cause of the universe.³³ The teleological proof of the existence of God is, his manifestation in the orderliness, design and beauty of the universe. For

Sayyid Ahmad Khan the existence of God is the logical implication of the Law of causation, he states, that everything in the world has a cause, Following the course of natural causation, each cause is linked with otherthing by chain of causation. This chain necessarily ends in the First Cause.³⁴ Thus to Sayyid Ahmad Khan Law of causation is another name for naturalism, with God as cause of the causes. This ultimate cause, which is actively existent, causeless, is God Almighty and Absolute, briefly called Jovoh, Allah, Khuda and God.³⁵ He further explains that the Naturalists believe God, as cause of causes, as an absolute, eternal and infinite. They argued in three ways, firstly from the very existence of God, that He exists. Secondly, from His eternity, that God's existence from present to unlimited past. There being no time of His origin. He existed all along. Thirdly, His existence in the infinite future i.e. immortality.³⁶ Sayyid Ahmad Khan was conscious of the theological difficulty arising from the Law of causation. He referred to the views of Muslim Philosophers and Ibn-i-Sina about the necessary causation

33. Ahmad Khan, Sayyid, "Tafsir-ul-Quran", Vol.I, p-15. Usul I, p.3, and Maqallat-i-Sir Sayyid Vol.III, pp.239

34. Ibid. p.241.

35. Ibid. "Hua-Al-Mauj'ud", pp. 304-305.

36. Ibid. P.303.

leading to the Materialistic view and the eternity of matter. He also mentioned Al Ghazali's criticism of causation who considered it against religion and Ibn-i-Taymia's criticism who doubted the validity of the argument leading to materialism and atheism. According to Sayyid Ahmad Khan both are mistaken. They have confused the views of philosophers and materialists because of the undeveloped state of natural philosophy and sciences at that time. Modern development in the field of natural sciences shows the validity of the law of causation. The close observation of existent objects of the world proves that every cause is inextricably linked with other things and causes. This process of cause and effect in due course goes through a constant change and a new compound takes place i.e., the causes effect other causes, effects become the cause of other effects. This chain necessarily ends in the Last cause, the cause of causes. This natural process is related to creation and not against it, as mistakenly ascribed by Ibn Taymia. And the reply to the misconception of those who considered God inactive after the creation of natural laws is that, as every thing is caused, its existence ultimately depends on the First cause, if this connection is broken the whole Universe would perish and nothing would exist for one second.³⁷ Sayyid Ahmad Khan further elaborates his point with an example of a Tree, which develops from a seed with the help of soil, water, sunlight.³⁸ God, being the First cause, the whole creation took effect at His command and thus entered on its life. God's relation to His creation is that of a craftsman, who determines the Characteristics, functions and positions of the different parts of his machine, example is that of a watchmaker who co-relates the different parts of the watch and makes them function according to his will. So God created the universe and ordained its laws once for all. The nature is left to work out itself in obedience to the laws originally given by God. No deviation, no change, no adjustment in

37. Ibid. P.283-285 "Kiya Nature Ke Ma'ni Se Khuda' Mua'tel Ho Jata Hai"

38. Ibid. P.239-241.

the established laws of the nature or His promise is possible, as that would imply a detraction from the perfection of His attributes.³⁹ God would never introduce any correction in to His creation later on which from the beginning reflected His omniscience and omnipotence. Elaborating this point in the Eighth principle of Exegesis he states, "All attributes of the Divine Being are infinite and absolute..... But so long as the present natural law exists no deviation from it or from His promise is possible..... The making of the promises He has made and the establishment of the universe on the basis of natural laws are proofs of His omnipotence, and fulfilling the promises made by His own volition is not inconsistent with the Divine attributes of absoluteness and infiniteness".⁴⁰ He, then sets forth a number of quotations from the Quran and states that these verses show that God has made promises and He is not going to break them." No change will you find in the habit of God."

48:23, 5:12&13, 9:6, 19:16, 2:74, 7:42,

41:45, 3:7, 73:18, 40:57&77.⁴¹

In the moral sphere, the absolute laws of right and wrong work. Man has the capacity to differentiate between right and wrong. This capacity is given to man by God once and for all, in order to realize the end for which he is created. As "Everything acts according to its nature" Sayyid Ahmad Khan while quoting the verse from the Quran states man is subject to the same law. Pain and pleasure are the logical result of the kinds of acts performed by man. Thus in moral as well as in physical sphere there is no need of God's interference. Thus finally he states that neither is the Quran contrary to the law of

39. Ahmad Khan, Sayyid; Tafsir-ul-Quran.. Vol.I, Usul-5.

40. Ibid. p.5.

41. Ibid. Usul. p.5-9.

nature nor is the law of nature contrary to religion. There is nothing which is against Fitrat-allah.⁴²

Nature

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view about nature is not systematic. At one point he has taken it in the sense of a physical universe of natural causation⁴³ which he has inherited from the nineteenth-century Naturalism. Thus it follows that only the laws of physical causation operate and nothing happens without sufficient cause for it. There is continuous chain of antecedent and inevitable consequence without any change. No doubt the world of nature is all around us with physico-chemical laws, but this is not the only law operating in the whole universe. There is human nature and supra-human nature as well. In the world of life, consciousness and mind physical laws are inapplicable. Man, for example, feels with regard to himself that his actions are not the result of invariable antecedent and consequent sequence, or that a particular pattern of behaviour is not purely externally determined e.g. the same stimulus will produce the same result in the physical realm but the same stimulus in the same man may lead to variety of responses. The inner stand point of the self⁴⁴ which is distinguished from the character of self, determined as it is by the heredity, environment and past causation while keeping in consideration the needs and motives of the agent supersedes the physical law of causation. Moreover, the nature of

42. Ibid Usul. p.7., and Tabzibul Akhlaq. Vol. II, p.307.

43. Pani Pati; ed. Maqallat-i-Sir Sayyid. Vol. III. P-278.

44. Lillie, W., An Introduction to Ethics, p.54,".... the ultimate substance of mind is of a kind that allows a rather larger free play to its states or processes than do most physical substances". Prof. C.A. Campbell has suggested in Defence of Freewill, "there is also an inner stand point, and in it we do definitely give meaning to causation by the self. as distinguished from character of the self, determined as it is by heredity and environment and of course by past self causation.

mental causation is different from physical or material causation. Psychology and philosophy are unable to determine scientifically how mental causation works on body, (physiological causation/physical causation) though experience proves that mind acts and interacts on body in many ways which is beyond the grasp of reason. This takes us to another sphere known by mystics as spirit or soul, which lies beyond the order of physical nature. So the universe cannot be said to be identical with the physical world alone. The world of matter is the world of science. Sayyid Ahmed Khan being an admirer of Science, scientific knowledge and reason considered it a must for the progress and advancement of nations. Moreover, it was he who propogated the modern knowledge among muslim youth in Indo-Pakistan, because he considered it his duty to defend the religion of Islam and to show that it is in conformity with nature and rational standpoint of sciences and to reveal its original bright face.⁴⁵ According to him, greatness of western nations lies in their reliance on sciences. But scientific knowledge, though very important, is not the entire knowledge, nor is the whole universe controlled by scientific knowledge of cause and effect and there is no freedom of action . With these unalterable mechanical laws scientists reduce every complex phenomena into a simple one. Human mind and consciousness is reduced to physio-chemical process. The result was total denial of God and autonomy of moral values. It was because of Sayyid Ahmed Khan's uncritical acceptance of nature and natural laws, that he was accused of being a naturalist, ~~ah~~ahrayia or an atheist. But soon in a reply to a letter he clarified his belief in God, the status of the Prophet and the day of judgement.⁴⁶ But if we look at the different details of his naturalism, it follows that he was not systematic naturalist philosopher in a real sense. He uses naturalism for the deliberation of natural sciences. He discussed the

45. Hali, Altaf Hussain; " Hayat-i-Javid". p.235., and Majmua Lectures, P.298.

46. "Maqallat". Vol. XIII. "Khuda, Rasool aur Qayamat Ke Muta'liq, Sir Sayyid Ke Aqa'id". p.52 and "Actiqade Billah".p.3.

three categories of natural scientists. The first category believes that the world is composed of matter and mechanical laws of nature operate in it. God is irrelevant so faith in God is utterly useless. They are atheists. The second group asserts that reality exists only in empirically verified facts or laws of nature. May be, God exists, may be he does not. They are called skeptics. The third category of scientists because of their intensive research in laws of nature, and on the basis of magnificent display of design in nature, believes in a world that is ruled by the laws of nature. God is the creator of these Laws. He is the Designer or Cause of all causes. They are true muslims, true naturalists and follow truthfully the principles of Islam.⁴⁷ Here Sayyid Ahmed Khan tried to graft his purely theistic views of nature on anti-theistic naturalism without bothering much about the logical inconsistency involved in it. In the instance of his scientific approach he saw an alliance between religion and science by pointing out that whatever one chose, it disclosed the power, wisdom and goodness of God. People are highly mistaken when they consider that natural sciences and religion are opposed to each other. They have two different sets of concerns, but they are not dialectically opposed to each other. Religion deals with ultimate cause i.e., The Creator and the creation of things, science explains the nature of existing things, it is concerned with observation and experiment and a search for connections among the data, e.g., how water came into being? How the clouds are formed etc etc., ⁴⁸ He saw nature as 'the work of God' and defined religion as 'the word of God' and asserted that Islam being a natural religion there is no dichotomy between the 'work' and 'word' of god.⁴⁹ He sets forth many verses from the Quran describing nature as a sign of God's existence. "See they not the clouds, how they are created? And the heaven, how it is raised ? And the mountains, how they are fixed?

47. Abid. Vol. III. pp. 277-276.

48. Abid. pp. 281-282.

49. "Usul".p.14.

And the earth, how it is spread out?" (88:17-20). He also cited the cases of the prophets who through nature, transcend to the spiritual reality behind,⁵⁰ for instance the case of Moses who longed and wished eagerly to see God, the reply was, "By no means canst thou see Me, but look upon the mountain". (7:43). The mountain contained nothing but nature and natural laws. Moses forgot, that God can not reveal himself to the naked eye or be seen; but His Divine presence/essence can be seen in nature and inspires faith in His Existence.⁵¹ In the same way Abraham gained access to God by prophetic experience through immutable laws of nature. It was deep contemplation of nature, its manifestation which enabled him to reach the spiritual reality i.e., God. Emmanuel Kant expressed the same view when he said, "Two things will fill mind with evernew and increasing admiration;- the starry heaven above and the moral laws within."⁵² Thus Sayyid Ahmad Khan identified Islam in its purest form with nature in an article entitled, "Islam is nature and nature is Islam". And believed that "neither the Quran is contrary to the Laws of nature, nor is the Law of Nature contrary to religion, there is nothing against Fitrat-allah".⁵³ His naturalmindedness takes us to Shah Waliullah's idea of evolution written by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in one of his articles. It explains how the different sets of laws are working in different spheres of nature. During the first period which was the lowest period of this universe, there was only inorganic matter. This stage of matter is without any consciousness and is purely controlled by external forces. Matter being the acme of the Laws of Creation, laws peculiar to the existence and working of matter were in practice. The mechanical laws operated the entire universe for a very long period perhaps million or billion of years. In the course of time, this stage i.e. inorganic matter received the

50. "Khutubat". p.186.

51. Tafsir-ul-Quran, Vol.I.P.88.

52. Titus.HI. "Ethics for Today."

53. Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq Vol. II. p.307.

blessing of God and assured the form of organism. So matter with life came into existence. The second evolutionary stage of matter with different set of Laws related to growth and assimilation came into force, though the mechanical laws remained in practice. The evolution did not stop here. The organic matter received the blessing of God. The additional qualities of sensation started working in them, with the result of the appearance of animals with another set of laws more suitable for the natural development of this stage. This stage continued till it came to an end. Then animals received a strange blessing from God. Another set of laws came into being without annihilating the former laws. Man appeared superseding the previous grades. He was the highest manifestation of life in the world. He is given some extra qualities which are not shared by the lower grades. Man like animals has sensation, feeling and emotion, but his distinction is mind, consciousness and reason. It follows that these four different levels of being have different sets of laws, aptly applicable to each level. The laws of lower grades do not apply to the higher grades though the higher grades can use, guide and control them in accordance with the laws which govern them. So it follows, what is natural law for the higher grade is supernatural for the grade below, finally man is supernatural for all the grades or forms of life in the lower realm till it reaches the highest realm which works naturally with the whole of creation for its higher objects and ends, which seems supernatural to men. Looked at from this angle the miracle would appear as the guidance, influence or the effect of the causation of the highest grade on the existence of lower grade, i.e., man. Sayyid Ahmad Khan believes that the lower grades are subordinate to the higher grade and must be controlled by it. So the whole universe becomes a single system organized in a hierarchical form, starting from matter and ending

with God, the cause of all causes or the Final Cause. In the true sense, the realm of nature is not inconsistent with God.

INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The concept 'Intersubjectivity' is one of the most crucial and subtle areas for the understanding of existentialist thought. It is true that for Kierkegaard the relation between man and man gets relegated to the secondary position. For the 20th Century existentialists, however, intersubjective relationship, though seen from diverse angles, remains an essential ingredient of human existence. Obviously, a distinction must be made between Heidegger and Sartre on the one hand and such thinkers as Buber, Marcel and Camus on the other. While for the former the intersubjective tends to remain only a dimension of the self, the latter see it as central to human existence.

Heidegger's concept of intersubjective relationship remains the vague 'we' of the *Mitsein* - a being with others which expresses itself in solicitude and not in the Sartrean conflict between one person and another. No doubt, for Heidegger, *Dasein* and not *Mitsein* is the most basic concept. But, even Sartre's stress on conflict and particularity enables him to go no farther than the 'I-It' or the subject-object relationship. Karl Jaspers, Merleau Ponty as well as Camus, Buber and Marcel go beyond mere man-thing connection to inter-subjective communication where the 'other' really exists in the radical 'I-Thou' (*Je et toi*) context. The distinction is significant both morally and epistemologically.

Despite Heidegger's emphasis on *Dasein ist Mitsein*, his definition of existence as 'toward death' effectively denies any ontological status to intersubjectivity. For him, 'death' is one's 'ownmost, not-to-be-outstripped, non-relational possibility.' "With death", he says, "Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality for being. . . This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has fully assigned to its ownmost

potentiality-for-being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one." (Being and Time, p.294).

Heidegger's peculiar stance that makes death the pinnacle of authentic existence leaves little scope for it to be considered as ultimately intersubjective. For him as for Kierkegaard, there is little difference between the relation to the 'crowd' and the direct interpersonal relationship which deepens rather than endangers one's existence as a 'single one.' They see relation to others either as a secondary product of one's lonely relation to God (as in Kierkegaard) or as one's own anticipated death (as in Heidegger). Consequently, it is least possible for them to join hands with Buber in the recognition that I become a self with other selves and am confirmed in my uniqueness through being made present by others in dialogue.

It will be wrong to compare Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship with intersubjective relations in general. According to Buber, a man may have an 'I-Thou' relationship with nature, art, science as well as with other human beings. It includes a reality of 'overagainstness', separateness and an 'inner-worldly monastic solitude'. In the 'I-Thou' relationship the partners are neither two nor one. On the other hand, they stand in an interaction in which each becomes more deeply himself as he responds more fully to the other. This includes both life and death. He writes: "A great relation exists only between real persons. It can be strong as death, because it is stronger than solitude, because it breaches the barriers of a lofty solitude, subdues its strict law, and throws a bridge from self-being across the abyss of dread of the Universe". (Between Man and Man, p.175).

Sartre appears even less enthusiastic about genuine intersubjective relationship. For him, I know the other as a subject only when his presence affects me or when I become aware of the fact that he is trying to turn me into an object (just as I try to do to him). I do not actually know the 'other' directly but only as a part of my own consciousness. Even the fact that I am aware of the 'look' of the other does not in the least mean that I am aware of how the other really sees me. I see his eyes seeing me, but I do not see through his eyes. Thus, Sartre rules out, in advance, the possibility of 'each to each', direct knowledge of the other as a 'Thou'. He is

never fully in a position to divest himself from Cartesian mind-body dualism and the Cogito remains for him the one certain starting point. Consequently, his concept of intersubjectivity fails to transcend the universe of isolated consciousness that divides one man off from the other.

Marcel, on the other hand, sees intersubjective relations in the context of human intimacy particularly in the family circle. For him, intersubjectivity is diametrically opposed to ego-centricity which he qualifies as the 'isolation of the self' and a sort of death. It is generally agreed that one cannot claim to nurture his personality alone or in social isolation. Marcel elevates this common-place to the status of a metaphysical principle. He argues that the self is essentially hetro-centric and accordingly, self-knowledge can only begin in communion with others. He remarks: "I communicate effectively with myself only to the degree that I communicate with others." (Du Refus a L'invocation. p.150). It seems that subjectivity, for Marcel, is actually intersubjectivity. In other words, self is constituted by its relation with others - the presence of the self is simultaneously the co-presence of the 'Thou.'

Jaspers has viewed existential communication from various angles stressing upon dynamic and dialectical nature of intersubjectivity. He visualises a process in which the participants become what they are as persons confront each other in their historical setting. Consequently, communication is designated as bringing of the self into being rather than the transmission of something already in existence. For Jaspers, therefore, there can be no self outside the communicative situation - selfhood comes into being in the give and take of human contact.

According to Jaspers, the most extreme form of existential communication is philosophy. In philosophising, people constitute themselves as unique persons beyond their particular structures. Philosophic truth is a function of this communication. Such truth can take place only in a dialogue where two authentic selves seek to clarify their being. Jaspers thus points out that we are ultimately faced with the problem of discovering the concepts necessary for undertaking the most profound communication possible. This is so because beyond all the structures of art and science, there remain men with whom we can communicate. Thus Jaspers takes Marcel's position to its logical end by showing that intersubjectivity is not only

essential to human existence but central to it. This is in direct contrast to the views of Heidegger and Sartre who are able to draw only an amorphous picture of intersubjectivity.

It appears that each successive existential thinker has sought to sharpen the issue of intersubjectivity. It is in Buber that we find the issue in the sharpest focus. This is particularly so when he points to the 'between' as the real ontological ground of existence. The issue is further accentuated with his typological distinction between 'I-Thou' and 'I-It' and his keen understanding of the knowledge of dialogue as including not only direct contact and mutuality but also an experiencing of the other side.

Marcel and Jaspers, though coming quite close to Buber's stand point, however, fail to appreciate how essential experiencing the other side is for every type of relationship including love and friendship, education, psychotherapy and ethical action. In all these human activities the intersubjective knowledge of the others' uniqueness alone enables to meet and know him as a 'Thou'.

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WITTGENSTEIN'S PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING

The picture theory of meaning is central to the structure of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. "It presents a high point of development of an historic line of thought. The idea that the proposition is an interweaving of simple names representing an interweaving of simple elements is to be found in Plato's *Theaetetus*"¹ But what concerns us here is not the historic background of the picture theory itself as it crystallized in the *Tractatus*. In this short essay I would try to state the theory first, and then see whether or not it actually faces what David Keyt calls the paradox of the picture theory.

A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me (4.021).

This passage from the *Tractatus* constitutes Wittgenstein's central argument for his picture theory of meaning. Wittgenstein seems to believe that it belongs to the essence of a picture that we understand it without having had it explained to us. Propositions have the same character and hence they are also pictures. Once we know the meaning of names or simple signs that constitute a proposition, we can immediately understand their sense. "A proposition shows its sense" (4.022).

1. G.E.M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, (London, 1959), p. 78.

Basically Wittgenstein has elementary propositions in mind and what they portray are atomic facts or states of affairs in the world. "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"(1.1). An atomic fact is a concatenation of simple objects and is not analysable as a function of other facts. Simple objects are the substance of the world and constitute all the atomic facts in the world. It is these atomic facts that are pictured by elementary propositions. As for molecular propositions they are truth-functions of elementary propositions and, upon analysis, resolve into a number of elementary propositions plus some logical constants.

As defined in the Tractatus elementary propositions do not contain any logical constants or words like "not", "and" or "all". "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names"(4.22). And names in their turn stand for simple objects. "A name means an object. Object is its meaning"(3.203). Also "configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the proposition sign"(3.21). Furthermore elementary propositions are logically independent of each other (4.211, 5.134); and they assert the existence of a possible state of affairs (4.21). In what sense then is a proposition a picture of reality? How does it portray an atomic fact? Wittgenstein's central idea here is that a proposition shares its logical structure with the atomic fact it portrays. In other words in order for a proposition to portray an atomic fact they must both have the same logical form. "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture"(2.151). And "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form"(2.17). Wittgenstein speaks of a "logic of depiction" or a "law of projection" which makes it possible for a proposition to picture reality. "There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records"(4.014). Given this law of projection a proposition can portray an atomic fact whose structure it shares

It is important to note that a proposition is a logical picture of reality. "A picture whose pictorial form is a logical form is called a logical picture" (2.181). And "A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs" (2.201). An elementary proposition then, is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs. Being a picture of a possible state of affairs is what constitutes the sense or meaning of a proposition. Its truth and falsity, on the other hand, are to be determined by whether or not it portrays an actual state of affairs. Every elementary proposition must have a sense but it may or may not be true. The problem of false, elementary propositions is a crucial one. It hinges upon Wittgenstein's distinction between simple signs or names and a propositional sign. "A name means an object. The object is its meaning" (3.203). Clearly a name would be meaningless if it does not have an object as its referent. On the other hand a propositional sign signifies only a possible state of affairs. It would be meaningful even if such a possible state of affairs does not exist. It may be asked: how can a proposition be false without being meaningless? Answer to this question in the Tractarian picture theory is that an elementary proposition basically is articulate and composite (3.141), and each name in the proposition may signify something existent; but the whole articulate proposition may not signify anything at all. It may not have an actual state of affairs as its referent. In that case it would be false. It can further be asked how can a proposition possibly portray a state of affairs which does not exist at all? Wittgenstein would say that a proposition can simply be an arrangement of names rather than an arrangement of objects signified by the names (4.0311). And in that case it, obviously, would be a false picture.

THE PARADOX REVISITED

David Keyt in one of his articles² formulates what he calls the paradox of the picture theory of language. He asks us to consider the proposition "Seattle is West of Spokane". He grants that this is not an elementary proposition but asks us to suppose that an elementary proposition would be something like this one. He goes on to say:

This proposition is composed of three parts (giving a logical rather than a grammatical analysis): two proper names and the predicate "is west of". Now pictured by the proposition is an arrangement of ~~two cities~~ but the proposition itself is an arrangement of three parts. Thus the fact and the proposition do not appear to have the same number of parts. But Wittgenstein holds that they must: "In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents. The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity" (4.04). Suppose we preserve the one-to-one correspondence between the fact and the proposition by dropping the predicate and writing the proposition simply as "Seattle Spokane". But if this arrangement of names pictures the fact that Seattle is west of Spokane, how will we picture the fact that Seattle is north of Portland? Well, we can do this by writing "Seattle" over "Portland":

Seattle
Portland


This gives us the second part of the puzzle. For this is no longer a proposition but a map".³

2. David Keyt, "Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language", *Philosophical Review*, 73, (1964), PP. 493-511.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 496-7.

Keyt goes on to conclude that "either the picture theory is able to explain only a poverty-stricken language (one in which, say, the relation of being west of can be expressed, but not the relation of being north of) or else it ignores a striking difference between propositions and maps.⁴ I feel that it is an interesting problem that Keyt poses for the picture theory of language. He rejects what he calls "Evans-Stenius" and , "Copi-Anscombe" solutions of this paradox and finally constructs his own. My basic concern here is to argue that Keyt's paradox simply does not apply to Wittgenstein's picture theory if we do not forget why Copi and Anscombe interpret the picture theory the way they do. I would not go into Evans-Stenius solution or Keyt's grounds for rejecting it.

Both Professors Copi and Anscombe seem to believe that the *Tractatus* does not take qualities or relations as kinds of objects. Now, as an elementary proposition is entirely made up of names of objects(4.22) they conclude that nothing in an elementary proposition refers to a quality or a relation. A relation of objects is portrayed simply by a relation of their names. Naturally both Copi and Anscombe deny that propositions are linear structures and that concatenation is the only relation of names. According to Anscombe if we analyse an elementary proposition we get something like this:



And Copi says that "any relation of objects, spatial or non-spatial, can be represented by a spatial relation of the names of those objects."⁶ Clearly Copi-Anscombe interpretation of elementary propositions steers clear of Keyt's paradox. It is easy to see that the relations "is west of" and "is north of" would be portrayed by the relations of the names in our propositions. But Keyt is uncomfortable with this solution for obvious reasons. His formulation of "the paradox of picture theory" rests on the assumption that there is a "striking difference between elementary propositions and maps". Keyt

4. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

5. G.E.M. Anscombe, "Mr. Copi On objects, Properties, and Relations in the *Tractatus*". *Mind*, 68 (1959), p. 404.

6. Copi and Beard, *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. (London, 1966), pp. 167-186.

believes that Copi-Anscombe solution ignores this difference by not taking propositions as linear structures. Which, according to Keyt, amounts to conceding "that the picture theory is inconsistent with a characteristic feature of language."⁷ He believes that there is little direct evidence for or against the Copi-Anscombe interpretation of the Tractatus.

Let us now turn to Keyt's own solution of the paradox. Keyt calls the dilemma facing the picture theory as "the problem of the predicate". And says that "if the proposition "Seattle is west of Spokane" contains one part too many for there to be one-to-one correspondence between proposition and state of affairs, why not simply not count the predicate?"⁸ And this is exactly what he does in order to resolve the paradox. He believes that if we think that there is one-to-one correspondence between symbols and states of affairs, in the case of a map, we are mistaken. We are ignoring the scale and the arrow customarily found on maps. Keyt believes that the reason the arrow is written on the margin of a map is that it does not "enter into a triadic relation with the symbols for, say, Seattle and Spokane."⁹ The arrow rather, indicates how the dyadic relation between these two symbols is to be taken: if the one symbol is left of the other, the arrow indicates (perhaps) that this relation pictures the one city as west of the other."¹⁰ Keyt believes that the predicate of a proposition functions in a similar way and hence, we can drop it while matching up a proposition with the situation it portrays. Once the predicate is dropped there obtains a one-to-one correspondence between the picture (elementary proposition) and the state of affairs it portrays.

I think that Keyt's paradox rests on a mistaken assumption. He rightfully believes that the propositions of ordinary language have a linear structure. But his assumption that elementary propositions in the Tractarian sense must also have the same characteristic is not warranted by any evidence in the Tractatus. Indeed we have some evidence to the contrary. As Russell points out in his introduction to the Tractatus Wittgenstein "is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language". And that is how Copi and Anscombe interpret the Tractatus. Copi says that in the Tractatus "the tendency to reject ordinary language seems to me to predominate."

9. *Ibid.*, p. 510.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 510.

Wittgenstein was concerned with the construction of "an adequate notation" (6.122)¹¹. Now given this particular Copi-Anscombe orientation, I do not think that Keyt can reject their understanding of an elementary proposition simply on the ground that it violates some special characteristic of ordinary language. If Wittgenstein of the Tractatus is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language, how can we put his notion of an elementary proposition on the procrustean bed of "ordinary language"? Indeed, there is no reason for Keyt's paradox to arise if we accept Copi-Anscombe interpretation of an elementary proposition.

Keyt's own solution of his paradox takes predicates in a proposition on the analogy of marginal arrows on a map. But as he concedes himself it is not possible to reconcile the notion of an elementary proposition containing a predicate with Wittgenstein's view that "an elementary proposition consists of names. It is nexus, a concatenation of names"(4.22). I think it is safe to conclude that, whatever its other shortcomings, the picture theory of language as propounded in the Tractatus certainly does not face Keyt's paradox. Only we should check our tendency to read the characteristics of ordinary language in the Tractarian notion of an elementary proposition.

11. Copi and Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

RAZI ON RELIGION ——— A Critique

Mohammad ibn Zakriya al-Razi (864-925 A.D.), 'the greatest non-conformist in the whole history of Islam¹ is a naturalist and a faithful devotee of reason. He holds that as a mode of knowledge reason is supreme and that there is no surer way to understand truths about facts and values. "The Creator (exalted be His name);", he writes, "gave and bestowed upon us reason to the end that we might thereby attain and achieve every advantage.... It is God's greatest blessing to us and there is nothing that surpasses it in procuring our advantage and profit... By reason", he continues to say, "we have comprehended matters obscure and remote, things that were secret and hidden from us... by it we have achieved even the knowledge of the Almighty, our Creator... We must consult it in all matters, conducting our affairs as it dictates and bringing them to a stop when it so commands"² Consequent upon this glorification of natural reason, Razi denies cogency and usefulness of the institution of prophesy as well as genuineness of all revelation. Books on medicine, astronomy and then scientific subjects as well as the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle are, in his opinion, preferable to the entire religious literature as the former have provided immense benefits to man in terms of promoting harmonies and adjustments and making life worth-living. The latter, on the other hand, is, for him, responsible for narrow-minded attitudes of people and for all sorts of dissensions between man and man. Prophets, among themselves, are opposed to one another in their teachings and so are not reliable, he holds. They are not superior to ordinary human beings in any way. Miracles, reportedly having been performed by them, are no more than legends and fanciful myths. Having thus dismissed religion as a futile institution full of

1 Majid Fakhri, A History of Islamic Philosophy, p.97.

2 A.J. Arberry (Ir.), The spiritual Physick of Razes, PP. 20-21

confusions and contradictions, Razi further goes on to stress the impossibility of a rapprochement between philosophy and religion in the sense in which this problem was posed and discussed, directly or indirectly, by almost all the Muslim thinkers.

Rationalization of the traditional Islamic faith, which appears to have reached its climax in the religious thought of Razi, has a long history. It formally started with the Mu'tazilite theologians who, we know, flourished in the climate of opinion saturated with Greek thinking. They were among the earliest to put forth a sensible interpretation of the metaphysical Qur'anic concepts and produce a rationale of the attributes of God so that these could be reconciled with His oneness and with the moral freedom of man. The Ash'arites who rose in revolt against the Mu'tazilite 'heresies', also resorted to reason and logic to meet the logic of the 'free-thinkers'. They, in fact, encountered a lot of opposition from those of their own camp who held on to the opinion that religion should remain a matter of unreasoned conviction, pure and simple. So al-Ash'ari, the founder of this school, had to begin his career with an apology. He wrote a book *Istihsan al-Khawd*³ in which he brought out the serviceableness of the method of reason in religious matters. Anyhow, these two strains of rationalism pioneered respectively by the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites have persisted in the entire development of Islamic religious thought down to the present times in the form of liberalism and modernism, on the one hand, and an argued defence of orthodoxy, on the other.

Primarily there is no harm in the employment of rational arguments for the understanding of characteristically religious concepts and the solution of religious problems. The Qur'an, positively and in no uncertain terms, recommends a rational manipulation of experience in order to discover the significant nature of what it calls, the ayat of God that are spread everywhere in the external universe as well as in man's own being. We have also been asked to ponder over the Word of God: "Do they not reflect on the Qur'an or are there locks on their hearts".⁴ Further, the Qur'an says that those who are blind here will be blind in the hereafter,⁵ meaning thereby that one who chooses to be oblivious of the facts of life here and now will not have an encounter with the

3 full title of the work is *Risalah fi Istihsan al Khawd fil Kalam*

4 Qur'an. 47: 24.

5 Ibid, 17: 72

Ideal. But all this, of course, should not be taken to imply that reason is capable of going simply to any extent. The Qur'an itself, when carefully perused, gives, along with a strong commendation of reason, clear indication of its genuine limitations and infirmities. These limitations must be recognized by a philosopher of religion. Iqbal, in one of his lectures, rightly pointed out that philosophy has jurisdiction to judge religion no doubt, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms⁶. Evidently the most fundamental of these terms be that religion is not to be eliminated altogether during the operation of rational analysis. However, Razi, as we have seen, is prepared to accept no terms at all that might be offered on behalf of religion, his commitment to reason being absolute and total. As to his claim that natural theism is tenable, that it is possible to know God and prove His existence on purely rational and cosmological grounds, we need be reminded that the verses of the Qur'an that are generally quoted to substantiate this position do not 'adequately' do so in the strictly logical sense of this term. The Qur'an conceives the various phenomena of nature and facts of history only as the signs of God i.e., just the pointers to His existence. Thus, at the most, they point out the way in which a search for God can be fruitfully continued. What further helps in this enquiry is a problem independent by itself and needs a separate treatment. For the present it is sufficient to conclude that the phenomena of nature have not at all been stipulated to serve as the premises that would provide conclusive evidence for the existence of God. By no conceivable logic can eternity of God be deduced from temporariness and finitude that characterize natural existence.

Coming back to the main problem under discussion, let's try to understand what religion is. In this connection we find a medley of definitions. For instance:

'Religion is the belief in an everliving God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind'---- James Martineau.

'Religion is the recognition that all things are manifestations of a power which transcends our knowledge'--- Herbert Spencer.

'Religion is ethics, heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling'--- Matthew Arnold.

6. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. p.2

'The essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence'--Friedrich Schleiermacher.

What transpires from a careful study of these definitions is that they ultimately display a variety of attitudes towards the ultimate facts of existence. These attitudes can in the last analysis, be classified into three categories, viz., the attitude of an unqualified submission, the attitude of critical analysis and rational understanding and finally, the attitude of intuitive apprehension and sympathetic appraisal. Iqbal in his 'Reconstruction' calls them the periods of faith, thought and discovery, the stages, characteristically, of a layman, a philosopher and a mystic respectively. He says:

"In the first period religious life appears as a form of discipline which the individuals or a whole people must accept as an unconditional command without any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command. This attitude may be of great consequence in the social and political history of a people, but is not of much consequence insofar as the individual's inner growth and expansion are concerned. Perfect submission to discipline is followed by a rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate sources of its authority. In this period religious life seeks its foundation in a kind of metaphysics- a logically consistent view of the world with God as a part of that view. In the third period metaphysics is displaced by psychology and religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. It is here that religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality"?

It is sometimes believed that the attitudes of faith, thought and discovery operate independently and that the persons concerned with religion thus stand classified, correspondingly, into three distinct categories. Razi, on this analysis, would belong to the second category. Anyhow, despite, Razi's exclusive infatuation with reason and for that matter, a similar passion of the laymen for faith and of the mystics for their characteristic intuitions, the fact is that faith, thought and discovery belong to a continuing series which is duly presided over by a supra-rational, direct and immediate cognition of the ultimate reality. Thus there is no water-tight

7. Ibid, p. 181

distinction between them. The ultimate reality stands realized more and more as we go up from the lowest to the highest stage.

Let's take faith first. Faith is generally defined to be a passive, irrational and blind certitude. But really it is not so. It is rather a conative state of mind characterised by immediate awareness whatever be the quality of that awareness of the object of faith. It is, as Iqbal puts it talking specially of religious faith, 'a living assurance begotten of a rare experience.'⁸ When, for instance, I say that I have faith in Mr. X, I do not say so without any rhyme or reason. I may not be able to actually give a rationale of my faith but still it must be grounded in sound knowledge. Had this not been the case, I might as will meet any person in the street and say that I have faith in him. The kind of knowledge to which the term 'faith' refers is direct, simple and basic and is therefore unshakable by analytical reasoning or, sometimes, even by the hard facts of everyday experience. A person who has faith in divine justice and love, for example, may find in the world events that exhibit injustice, hate and cruelty in the ordinary sense of these terms, but he irresistibly holds on to his faith. These and other such phenomena rather constitute a trial of his faith through which he almost invariably comes out successful and his faith is all the more strengthened.

Thought or reason, in an ordinary sense, is rightly considered to be incapable of grasping the ultimate reality in its organic wholeness; that is why Kant, the rationalist, declared thing-in-itself to be unknowable. However, reason has a deeper movement also which can be attained when it functions under the auspices of a cosmic insight, i.e., an insight into the total state of affairs. A beginner in mathematics, for instance, in order to do his sums has to undertake a lot of calculation but as he continues his exercise over a period of time, he develops what we may call, a mathematical sense. Those who have a natural, inborn taste for mathematics realize this sense much sooner than others. Anyhow, when this level of comprehension is reached one has not then always to go through all possible steps towards the solution. The solution simply dawns upon him immediately as the problems are posed. This is what Aristotle meant when he remarked that some people can hit upon the middle term without forming a syllogism in their minds. Similar is the case with the religious object. There are persons who know God through His names which, in turn, are understood somehow or other on the analogy of human attributes. But this would not be a true revelation

o. Ibid, p. 109

of the nature of God who is unique and has no likeness unto Him as the Qur'an says. On the other hand, a person who is moved by a sincere desire to have a genuine comprehension of God and ponders over the attributes and ways of God with thorough single-mindedness and absorption does ultimately cognize Him in His uniqueness and consequently the true significance of His attributes is known to him. This is what can be termed as the deeper movement of reason.

Discovery, the third and the last stage mentioned above, is a process that means personal encounter itself. It is thus different from knowledge or awareness in the barest sense of these terms. Russell in his 'Problems of Philosophy' makes a distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance and 'Knowledge by description'. The former, he says, is the knowledge of objects and persons of which we are directly aware without the intermediacy of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths; the latter, on the other hand, is indirect: it is knowledge through the description of a property or a set of properties that the object is claimed to possess. Anyway, neither in acquaintance nor in description can we as a rule be said to discover the nature of a person or an object. We truly discover only when we are involved in personal encounter with the object of our knowledge. In order to understand what personal encounter is we must refer to a further distinction emphasized by Martin Buber between 'I-It' and 'I-thou' relationships. In both knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description' I may equally have simply an 'I-It' relationship with the person known, that is, the person may be taken as an object only from which the 'I' as an observer stands detached. It is a relationship between a subject and an object. An 'I-thou' relationship, on the other hand, is dialogical as it is essentially a 'one-one' contact between two subjects. It is direct and mutual and involves a response which is thoroughly alien to the I-it attitude. If, for instance, I honestly seek to discover and understand thoroughly another person I must enter into an 'I-thou' a 'person to person' relationship with him. I may observe a person and his behaviour very minutely and I may collect the maximum amount of information about him from all possible quarters but still my knowledge of him will be deficient. In order to have sufficient knowledge, I will have to deal with him and have a dialogue with him in diverse situations. These two kinds of attitude - the 'I-it' and the 'I-thou' are found in men of religion as well. According to a classification made by John Dewey there are people who have a

religion' and there are people who 'live religiously'. The former, for all practical purposes, take God as an 'it' although they often do not realize this fact. They invariably approach Him with requests to forgive their sins, grant their prayers, and realize their aspirations. He is taken to be kind, loving, just and so on. In a remembrance and invocation of such attributes there is evidently an element of selfishness involved on the part of the man of religion. Incidentally, that is exactly why Hazrat Ali is reported to have once remarked that if a person loves God sincerely, he would be better advised to deny away His attributes. Those, on the other hand, who can be said to live religiously are above all selfish as well as externalist considerations in their approach to God. In their encounter with Him all considerations of personal convenience are totally held in obedience. They would burn the heavens and extinguish the fire of the hell so that God remains a goal realizable for His own sake. Instead of seeking to understand the attributes of God they would rather assimilate them with their own persons and thus earn a close companionship with God and a truly religious life.

So, whatever be the level at which we truly profess religion, it directly or indirectly does envisage a sympathetic, intuitive and total apprehension of the ultimate Real. Razi did not visualize this fact because of his unflinching and exclusive commitment to discursive reason. Actually, in the history of religious thought, whenever a thinker has made this sort of commitment, he, as a result of this, has necessarily reduced the religious phenomenon to the status of system of doctrines rather than a vital fact. The example of the Mu'tazilite thinkers immediately comes to our mind in this regard. Thus conceived, differences between religion and religion are bound to appear. It is verily because of this that Razi found contradictions between individual religions and so justifiably rejected the very institution of religion on that ground. However, if we duly take into account the essential nature of religion as a mode of direct experience, as I have explained above, then all genuine religions are ultimately found to be one: Ultimate Reality, the object of religious experience must of course be the same whatever be the shari'ah that we profess.

SHOWABILITY AND SAYABILITY IN THE TRACTATUS

An important aspect of Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositions is captured in his assertion: "What can be shown, cannot be said" (4.1212). Still some of his commentators have shown fundamental confusion regarding the meaning of this remark. The cause of this confusion, in my opinion, lies in the fact that some of these commentators have tried to over-extend the application of this remark in interpreting some other passages in the Tractatus. Particularly, Wittgenstein's ladder analogy passage, by the end of the book, has been a source of trouble. The passage runs as follows:

6.54: My propositions serve as elucidation in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as non-sensical, when he had used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)

He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.

In what follows I wish to comment basically on this ladder analogy passage. In so doing I would try to establish that confusions regarding Wittgenstein's remarks about "showability" and "sayability" have resulted from extending it to the areas where it does not apply. I would basically argue against the way Carnap and Pitcher have interpreted the ladder analogy passage.

The basic question before me is: What is the status of philosophical propositions stated in the Tractatus? Viewed in the light of the ladder analogy passage this question becomes particularly hard to answer. No wonder then that it has been answered divergently. George Pitcher, for example, assigns a showing status to the propositions of the Tractatus. He thinks that these propositions make us "see that certain important things are the case - things which are shown, but which cannot be said."¹

Carnap, on the other hand, takes a different view of the situation. He declares the Tractatus as inconsistent, and seems to imply that philosophical propositions can have sense. In other words they are sayable. In his *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, he says:

In the first place he seems to be inconsistent in what he does. He tells us that one cannot state philosophical propositions and that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent; and then instead of keeping silent he writes a whole philosophical book. Secondly, I do not agree with his statement that all his propositions are quite as much without sense as metaphysical propositions are. My opinion is that a great number of his propositions (unfortunately not all of them) have in fact sense; and that same is true for all propositions of logical analysis.²

First I wish to develop and examine the view which assigns a showing status to the propositions of the Tractatus. Pitcher thinks that "the Tractatus is filled with statements that could not possibly be construed as truth-functions of elementary propositions, that are not descriptive propositions about states of affairs, that are not propositions of the natural sciences. Indeed, it is filled with nothing

1. George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, (Prentice-Hall, 1964) p.155.

2. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1935) p.37

else; Wittgenstein would insist that no descriptive proposition - i.e. no proposition that simply states an empirical fact - has any place in a book of philosophy".³ Pitcher cites as example of a philosophical propositions the thesis from the Tractatus that the logical structure of a proposition is identical with the logical structure of the state of affairs it depicts. He says that as this thesis does not depict the existence or non-existence of any state of affairs in the world, it can only be assigned the showing-status. He goes on to equate this thesis with Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism;⁴ and says that, like solipsism, this thesis is also true. Their truth is shown by something. In case of solipsism it is shown by the fact that limits of my language mean the limits of my world (5-62); and in case of the above-mentioned thesis it is shown by the structure of elementary propositions and by that of the states of affairs they depict. Pitcher goes on to conclude that, in the ladder analogy passage, "Wittgenstein does not mean that his assertions are sheer non-sense, as if he had said "Gloom black pan fowfy". Nor does he mean that they are obfuscating nonsense, like the pseudo-propositions of some meta-physicians (e.g., "The Absolute is becoming"). Wittgenstein considers his philosophical assertion to be illuminating non-sense. What he had intended to say is quite true - only, as it turns out, it cannot be said. So we must grasp what it is that he intended to say, learn the lesson - climb up the ladder. But precisely in virtue of having done so, we will no longer continue trying to say such things, for we realize that they cannot be said. We will throw away the ladder by means of which we came to have this insight. We will see that certain important things are the case - things which are shown but which cannot be said."⁵ This is Pitcher's sympathetic interpretation of the ladder analogy passage in the Tractatus. I call it sympathetic because he says also that "one immediately feels a sense of uneasiness with Wittgenstein's position here, and I think it is in fact untenable." In this sense Pitcher's point of view seems to be no different from those who charge Wittgenstein with inconsistency. But, here I am concerned with his sympathetic interpretation primarily.

I feel that Pitcher is really mistaken in equating Wittgenstein's philosophical assertions with his discussion of solipsism.

3. Pitcher, op. cit., p.154

4. Ibid., p.153

5. Ibid., pp.154-5.

Wittgenstein uses the word showing only and only in connection with tautologies and contradictions, logical form, solipsism, and the mystical in its special sense. All these areas constitute the limits to our language for him. They only manifest themselves as limits, we cannot state them. For example, in regard to logical form of propositions, he says:

4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form. In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, this is to say outside the world.

So the logical form is only displayed by the propositions, they cannot represent it (4.121). In other words the logical form manifests itself, it shows itself, but it cannot be stated. Any such effort requires us to go beyond the limit of logic, but that is impossible. The limits of logic manifest themselves in the limit of our language. They show themselves but we cannot state them. Tautologies and contradictions also fall on the limits of the sensible discourse. Wittgenstein says:

5.143 Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at their centre.

And like all the limits they shows themselves as the limit. "Every tautology shows that it is a tautology" (6.127). Not only tautologies/contradictions and logical form but also solipsism and the mystical fall on the limits of the language or the world. Wittgenstein makes it abundantly clear in the following propositions.

5.62 ...For what solipsist means is quite true; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

It is obvious that, for Wittgenstein, there are things that manifest themselves as the limit to the language, to the factual world. They show themselves as the limits. It is in connection with these and only these things that Wittgenstein uses the word "showing" in its special sense. Philosophical propositions do not fall under this category precisely because they are not limits. In fact, they have got nothing to do with what Wittgenstein calls as the limits of the world or the limits of language. Now the heart of the matter is that Wittgenstein does not use his thesis "What can be shown, cannot be said" except for the category of things that manifest or show themselves as the limits to our language. And these limits cannot be stated. Any effort to do that i.e. to state these limits must end up in non-sense.

He declares his philosophical propositions as non-sensical in the ladder analogy passage in the same vein that he declares metaphysical or ethical propositions as non-sensical. All of them do not portray any possible states of affairs. Philosophical propositions are not non-sensical like the proposition "Gloom black pan fowdy"; they have the same status as the proposition of metaphysics. This position of Wittgenstein on the status of philosophical proposition, I believe, does land him in a paradox. The Tractatus certainly is a book filled with philosophical propositions, and if all of them are non-sensical then the Tractatus really is a self-defeating project. And this is exactly what Wittgenstein wanted it to be. We will return to this point a little later.

Pitcher seems to be really mistaken in his sympathetic interpretation of the ladder analogy passage, i.e., in assigning a showing status to the philosophical proposition in the Tractatus. There seems to be absolutely no reason to equate philosophical propositions with solipsism or the mystical in this regard. Philosophical propositions are elucidatory in their character, they play a clarificatory role, but they do not manifest themselves as the limits of our language or the world.

If we assign a showing status to the propositions in the Tractatus, we can't escape the conclusion that Pitcher reaches at, i.e.,

"we will see that certain important things are the case - things which are shown, but which cannot be said".⁶ But such a conclusion runs counter to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in the *Tractatus*. He says:

4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences).

4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

Philosophy does not result in philosophical propositions, but rather in the clarification of thoughts.

It is clear from these observations in the *Tractatus* that philosophy can only play a clarificatory role; it neither can state nor show anything to be the case. "The correct method in philosophy would be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy"(6.53). If Wittgenstein had intended to assign a showing status to his propositions in the *Tractatus* he would not have declared the role of philosophy to be only clarificatory. Nor would he say that these propositions are non-sensical and must be transcended in order to see the world aright; because he actually did not say any such thing, for example, about the solipsism or the mystical, the things which simply manifest themselves. He says explicitly that "philosophy settles controversies about the limits of natural sciences"(4.113). This clearly means that philosophy itself does not constitute these limits. "The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them (4.111). And whatever is above or below natural sciences is nothing but nonsense. If Wittgenstein states

6. *Ibid.*, p.154.

philosophical propositions in the *Tractatus*, he is fully aware of the paradoxical nature of his own project. He boldly admits it and asks us to throw away the ladder after climbing up it. This is the true meaning of the ladder analogy passage. If the *Tractatus* was not a paradoxical project it would not have served the purpose that it did i.e., it would not have proven the impossibility of philosophical propositions. The success of the book lies in its self-destructive character more than anywhere else.

Carnap rightly points out the inconsistency in the *Tractatus*. But, like many others, he also fails to appreciate the significance of Wittgenstein's paradox. Carnap says "I do not agree with his statement that all his propositions are quite as much without sense as metaphysical propositions. My opinion is that a great number of his propositions (unfortunately not all of them) have in fact sense."⁷ Now such a view of philosophical propositions viz. philosophical propositions with sense, cannot be held without doing violence to Wittgenstein's picture theory of language. The *Tractatus* is loud in claiming that sensible discourse is confined to the propositions which picture the existence or non-existence of possible states of affairs in the world. But clearly philosophical propositions do not picture any state of affairs. Hence Wittgenstein declares them to be nonsense. It is hard to imagine how Carnap has come to think that a great number of these propositions have sense. I think he fails to see the full import of the picture theory which draws clear boundaries between nonsense, sayable and showable. If Pitcher is guilty of over-extending showability, Carnap moves on to the other extreme. He seems to think that philosophical propositions can have sense; which is the same as sayability in the Tractarian theory of language.

It is clear from the foregoing that Wittgenstein's remark that "What can be shown, cannot be said" must be read in conjunction with his picture theory of language which demarcates the areas of showability and sayability. Otherwise we are bound to run into confusion.

7. Carnap. op. cit., p.37.

THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY TODAY

In August 1987, the Congress of the History of Medieval Philosophy, which holds its sessions every five years, met at the University of Helsinki (Finland). As a member of the Committee of the Society of the History of Medieval Philosophy, I was committed to elaborate a report on the Study of Islamic Philosophy during the period 1982-1987. I would like to give here a summary of my Report which will be published in extenso in the Bulletin of the Society.

Before entering *in medias res*, I think it would be useful to make some remarks on the validity of the appellation itself of Islamic Philosophy and its extension. This appellation has provoked many discussions among the historians of medieval philosophy and islamologists. These discussions took place when on the occasion of the first Congress of the History of Medieval Philosophy, I proposed to the organisers of the Congress to make, in their programme a place for Islamic or Arabic philosophy. The Committee agreed and asked me to prepare a project on the topic, given that up to this date this aspect of the History of Philosophy was practically ignored by the Western historians.

In order to present an exhaustive *status questionis* of the topic , I prepared a series of questions which I sent to two kinds of scholars :1) from one part, to the Western medievalist who, as philosophers were interested in the influence of Arabic Philosophy on the thinkers of the Middle Ages; these medievalists are generally philosophers who do not know Arabic and thus are obliged to use the Latin Medieval translations or modern translations of the Arabic texts. 2) from the other part, there are Arabists or also Arabs who know Arabic but do not know Latin so that they have another approach to the Arab philosophers.

I thought that the best solution was to have these two kinds of scholars work together, so that through these interdisciplinary contacts more light would be shed on our problem. I prepared ten questions or propositions, which I sent to almost fifty scholars specialized more or less in medievalism or in philosophy. Here is the list of these scholars disposed alphabetically:

Abel, Aghena, Ahwani, Allard, Al Verny (D'), Arberry, Arnaldez, Asghar Hekmat, - Bausani- Cantwell Smith, Cerulli, Chenu, Corbin, Dulude, Faruqi, Fazlul Rahman, Finnegan Geiger, Gregory, Gringnasch, Gandillace (de), Guillaume, - Hourani (G.), - Khodeiri, Klibansky, Kraemer, Kritzeck, Kutsch, - Lewis (G.), - Madkour, Makdisi, Masse, McCarthy, Men (de), Moin, Poraux. Raeymaecker, Ritter, Rosenthal (E.), Rosenthal (F.) - Taha Hussein, Tarachand.- Vajda, Vanden Bergh, Van Nieuwenhuize, Van Steedberghen, Vansteenkiste, Verbeke, Von Grunebaum .- Walzer, Wickens, Wilpert

Among the ten questions addressed to them two are important for our topic:

I. What appellation do you prefer : Islamic Philosophy or Arabic Philosophy?

II. What is the delimitation of this philosophy ? Must we limit it strictly to the Hellenistic Philosophy expressed in Arabic by Kindi, Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes etc. which was known in the Arabic world as Falsafa or Hikma, , or must we extend it to the methodology of the Sharia (Islamic Law), to Theology (Kalam), Mysticism (Tasawwuf), and Philosophy of sciences?

To understand the significance of the first question i.e. Islamic Philosophy or Arabic Philosophy ,we must keep in mind how

Avicenna and Averroes penetrated in the medieval West. Thomas Aquinas for instance and the Latin scholars mention Avicenna, Averroes or Algazel as representative of the "Arabs" because their works were written in Arabic and that Arab was a synonym for Muslim. And so the tradition was established to call their philosophy Arabic philosophy or Philosophy of Arabs and this was followed by the historians of philosophy up to twentieth century (of for instance, Scholliers, Munk, Brehier, Gilson). We have to wait up to de Boer, Gauthier, Corbin Sharif to see the use of Islamic Philosophy, or Philosophy of Islam.

It is therefore not astonishing to see how different were the answers to the first question. I gave them at length in my article of MIDEO (t.5 1958). I can summarize them in this way.

The partisans of the appellation "Arabic Philosophy" were particularly the Western medievalists (Chenu, Van Steenberghen, Gilson Wilpert) but also some Arabists (Kutsch, Cerulli, Kraemer, Kritzeck) and some Arabs (Taha Hussein, Khodeiri). Others preferred "Islamic Philosophy" (Madkour, Von Grunebaum, Ahwani Ali Asghar Hekmat, Tarachand, Gregory, Arberry). Makdisi suggested the expression "Arabic Islamic Philosophy"

Concerning Corbin, he protested vehemently against the appellation of "Arabic Philosophy"; he considered it not only narrow but also dangerous and false because this expression connotes political tendency. And in his book in French titled History of Islamic Philosophy he focused his vision on the Philosophy of Ishraq and the Hikma of Persian philosophers of the Safavids Renaissance after the 16th Century.

Those who have read the answers to our inquiry have seen that, theoretically, the problem is insoluble : it is impossible to find an adequate concept which embraces at the same time the linguistic point of view and the religious one. One can present good reasons for each aspect but none is decisive. One must accept a compromise which takes in to account the specific differences, and, why not say it, the national and religious susceptibilities.

It seems, in taking in to account these difficulties that the expression found by De Boer a half century ago is the one which offers the least criticism: Philosophy in Islam. With my friend the

late Prof. Gardet, I elaborated a formula which is near to De Boer's We proposed: "Medieval philosophy in Islamic Lands" (in French: "Philosophie medievale en Terre d'Islam"). From there, divisions derive naturally: 1) either according to the language in which the Philosophy is expressed, so we will have Arabic Philosophy, Persian philosophy, Hebrew Philosophy, Turkish Philosophy and also Latin Philosophy dealing with the medieval versions of these different philosophies; 2) or taking in to account the religion and then we will have Christian Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy, Jewish Philosophy.

Concerning the second question, i.e. the extension of the domain of Islamic Philosophy, the opinions also diverged. We can divide them in to five sections:

- 1) For the first group Islamic Philosophy must be limited to the Falsafa i.e. the Philosophy of Hellenistic inspiration (Chenu, Arberry, Ritter, Wilpert).
- 2) A second group maintains the Falsafa as principal subject of Islamic philosophy but would like also to include the religious sciences of Islam (Gardet, Rosenthal, de Menasce).
- 3) A third group adopts without hesitation also the kalam (Guillaume, Hourani).
- 4) The fourth group adds the mysticism (tasawwuf) (Achena, Schacht, Vanden Bergh).
- 5) The fifth group would like to include the methodology of jurisprudence (usul al - fiqh) (Bausani, Cerulli, de Gandillac, Khodeiri, Kritzck, Tarachand). Mille d' Alverny and Dr. Madkour include sciences and Arnaldez the grammar.

Finally Gilson magnanimously suggests extending the field in order: to receive all what is intelligible.

For the report presented at Helsinki, I adopted the four main groups: FALSAFA, KALAM, TASAWWUF AND SCIENCE.

1.FALSABA.

The Critical edition of al-Shifa' of Avicenna which has been undertaken at Cairo by Egyptian scholars, has been achieved by Said Zayed, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) al-Shifa', al-Tabi iyyat I. al-Sama al-tabi i , Le Caire, Hay'at al kitb, 1983, 240 pages.

The publication of the medieval Latin texts of al-Shifa' Metaphysics and De Anima had been published by Simone Van Riet of the University of Louvain. They are a masterpiece of high scholarship. She has also edited the De Generatione et corruptione:

Avicenna Latinus. Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I-X Lexiques 14+352 pages, Louvain-la Neuve - Leiden 1983
Avicenna Latinus - Liber Tertius Naturalim-De Generatione et Corruptione. Introduction doctrinale par G.Verbeke, VIII + 100 + 350 pages, Louvaine-la Neuve - Leiden 1987.

Jean Michot also of Louvain, has devoted his doctoral dissertation to Avicenna: La destinee de l'homme selon Avicenne .Le retour a Dieu (ma ad) et l'imagination. Academie Royale de Belgique ,Fonds Rene Draguet, t. V XLVIII + 240 pages, Louvain, Peeters.

I have also published the second volume of my translation into French of the Metaphysics of al-Shifa' Paris, Vrin 1985,237 pages.

Mlle Druart ,who has left the University of Georgetown for the Catholic University of America ,has published several interesting articles on Al-Farabi and Yves Marquet on Ismelism and on Ikhwan al-Safa'. Interesting documents on Averroes, Aristotles Arabus, Kindi, and the Greek sources of Islamic Philosophy have been also published.

This section contains 141 titles of books and articles.

II KALAM

Besides the important works of Mrs Bernand on al-Qadi Ibn al-Jabbar, particularly on his theory of knowledge and the studies of Prof. Frank of the Catholic University of America on the mutazilites, we have to mention two important books in this domain. The first is

that of al-Shahrastani, *Kitab al-Milal wal-nihal*. The translation of this capital text has been undertaken by three French eminent specialists Professors Daniel Gimaret, Guy Monnot and Jean Jolivet from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes of Paris. UNESCO has sponsored this translation which supersedes translation of Haarbrucker (in 1850). This first volume contains a brilliant introductory article of M.A. Sinaceur, Director of the department of Philosophy and Human Sciences at the UNESCO, titled "Shahrastani, tolerance et alterite". The distribution of the subjects among the authors is as follows. Gimaret deals with the prolegomena and the part concerning Islam. Jolivet translates and comments on the philosophical text and Monnot the non-islamic religions. This first volume is the work of Gimaret and Monnot:

Shahrastani, *Livre des religions et des sectes*, t. I, traduction avec introduction et notes par Daniel Gimaret et Guy Monnot, Peeters/Unesco, 1986, XXVI + 728 pages.

The second important work on kalam is the *Traite de theologie musulmane* of Robert Caspar, professor of Islamic Theology and Mysticism at the Pontifical Institute of Arabic and Islamic studies. Since the publication of the *Introduction a la theologie musulmane* of Gardet-Anawati in 1948, this is certainly the best general book on Kalam. This section contains 39 titles.

III. TASAWWUF

Two important publications deserve to be mentioned in this section, apart from the translations by Deladriere, of Junayd and Ghazali texts.

The first is the English translation of the great and classical book of Louis Massignon: *The Passion of al-Hallaj, mystic and martyr of Islam*. Translated from the French by Herbert Mason vol. I *The life of al-Hallaj*, 645 pages; vol.2. *The survival of al-Hallaj*, 493 pages; vol.3, *The teaching of al-Hallaj*, 360 pages; vol.4, *Bibliography and Index*, 294 pages. Bollingen series XCVIII, Princeton University Press, 1982.

This capital work on mysticism was revised and enlarged by the author himself before his death. It has been carefully edited by his son David Massignon with the collaboration of Louis Gardet and Henri Laoust. It is composed of four volumes totaling 2000 pages of

a condensed technical text, full of scientific notes. It was a difficult challenge to undertake its translation and one has to congratulate Mr Herbert Mason to have had the courage to realize this translation. He has worked in constant collaboration with the editors of the second French revised edition. That means that his translation has been carefully checked by the best scholars of Massignon's thought.

The four volumes are admirably edited with big legible print; notes are put on the bottom of the pages; the bibliography and the indexes are carefully reproduced. The book contains 47 illustrations and a beautiful portrait of Massignon in the beginning of the first volume. M. Mason has written an excellent and fervent biography of Massignon underlining the signification of his work.

The second important book in this section is the continuation of the monumental edition, by Othman Yahya, of *al-Futuh al-Makkiyya* of Ibn Arabi. In the period envisaged in my Bulletin, there have been published vol.VIII in 1985 and vol.X in 1987. This publication has given a strong emphasis to the studies devoted to the great Muslim mystic. One can have an idea of this activity in reading the two long reports of J.W. Morris, Ibn Arabi and his interpreters: Part I: Recent French Translations in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol.106 July-September 1986, pp.539-551; Part II oct. Dec. 1986, pp.733-756

This section contains 16 titles.

IV-SCIENCES

This section is, after that of *Falsafa*, the richest in original works. Many scholars have given interest to the history of sciences among the Arabs thanks to the numerous manuscripts on Arab sciences discovered in the libraries.

The development of this section is due to several factors. First to the "Centre d'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie arabes" which groups, in Paris, scholars from the CNRS (Conseil National de la Recherche scientifique) and from the "Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris 5e section), animated by two great historians of Arabic philosophy and science: Professors Rushdi Rashed, and Jean Jolivet. Two collections have been founded by them A, A

Collection of texts and studies B, A collection of studies and re-editions"

A. Texts and studies

This collection is consecrated to works on science and philosophy. According to the tradition of the "Collection Guillaume Bude" the texts, scientifically established, are edited, translated, explained and accompanied with an introduction and notes. Parallel to this collection there is a collection of studies on the texts.

B. Studies and editions

This collection has a double aim. First it contains studies, individual or collective, dealing with the history of Arabic sciences and philosophy, but independent of the edited texts; and also it contains a reproduction of ancient works no longer available of renowned scholars.

Some texts have already appeared:

1. The mathematical works of Tusi, text established and translated by Rushdi Rashid.
2. The astronomical work of Thabit Ibn Qurra, published by Regis Morelon.

Texts in preparation: works of al-Kindi, Ibn al-Haytham, Ibn Sahl, al-Farabi.

In the series "Studies and re-editions" there have already appeared:

10 *Entre arithmetique et algebre, recherches sur l'histoire des mathematiques arabes* by Rushdi Rashed.

20 *Etudes sur Avicenne* under the direction of Jolivet and Rashed.

30 *Jabir Ibn Hayyan* of Paul Kfous.

In preparation:

1. The Mechanics of Heron of Alexandria translated by Carra de Vaux.
2. Trois traites arabes sur le corps parfait, translated by Fr. Woepcke
3. Les livre des appareils pneumatiques et les machines hydrauliques of Philon of Byzantium translated by Carra de Vaux.

The Center is preparing also an "Encyclopedia of Arabic Sciences" under the direction of Rushdi Rashid and with the collaboration of 25 specialists.

The second factor which has contributed to the development of publications in the domain of the History of sciences among the Arabs is the activity of the Institute of Arabic Sciences (IHAS) of the University of Aleppo. A scientific Review of a high standard was founded in 1971 in which many eminent specialists published their works. In my Report I quoted the titles of the articles published in the issues of volumes 6(198) and vol.7(1983)

And to finish I must mention the Review founded by Prof. Fuad Segin of the University of Frankfurt, his numerous reproductions of manuscripts dealing with Arabic sciences, and the publications of some classical medical books by the Hamdard Institute founded by Hakim Mohammad Said, at Karachi.

SOCIAL FACTORS IN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Aesthetic experience is the experience which we have in the contemplation of beauty of any kind, in nature, in art or in social relations; and which gives rise in the beholder to a certain peculiar feeling which we may call aesthetic joy. It is a social phenomenon springing from the creative impulse, interest in people and interest in the world of reality and imagination which the artist has for them in his mind. On the basis of this creative impulse and interest he gives expression in creative form to some profound emotion or great thought which he wishes to share with other people. The artist or nature comes to the beholder with a gift-the gift of harmony, unity, completeness, purity and relief. To accept and appreciate this gift with profound knowledge and emotional warmth is aesthetic experience. This gift when so appreciated gives aesthetic joy. While we go deep into aesthetic experience, the self is forgotten, and there is a kind of absorption in the beautiful object a feeling of complete unity, freedom and completeness. Aesthetic experience has two characteristics which distinguishes it from other kinds of experiences intellectual and moral. It is different from them as it is the contemplation of beauty which the beautiful objects or their memory give rise in us; and secondly the joy which we get from aesthetic experience is disinterested, detached, impersonal, universal, permanent and pleasurable in revival in memory.

But it does not mean that in getting aesthetic experience we require a distinct kind of mental activity e.g. intuition, inspiration, imagination, insight or vision - the activity which is not regarded as essential in other kinds of experiences. We cannot divide the mind into different faculties, subscribing the different mental activities to different faculties, nor a man into so many men - an aesthetic man, a moral man, an intellectual man, a practical man and so on. In any

genuine experience all these elements inevitably enter; though in one form of experience, one mental process is predominant while in another form of experience, another kind of mental process is more required. Imagination e.g. plays an important part in aesthetic experience, perhaps more important part than in intellectual or moral experience. But knowledge, understanding etc., also have their share in it. Without them aesthetic experience is as difficult as intellectual or moral experience. Thus aesthetic experience is not different in kind from other experiences. It differs from others in emphasising one aspect of mental phenomenon i.e. affection. It emphasises affection, but it does not and cannot ignore the other two aspects of mental life - i.e. Cognition and Conation. They are and must be present in it. Though, no doubt, cognition and conation do not play so important a part in aesthetic experience as in intellectual and moral experiences respectively.

We have aesthetic experience when we perceive beautiful objects. But beauty lies everywhere - in nature, in art, in ideas, in ideals, in social relations, in moral endeavour, in economic activities - and thus we may get aesthetic experience from so many objects in this universe. But really speaking we choose only a few fragments and are inspired only by them. We are not inspired by each and every beautiful object. We select only a few objects - the objects which we regard as beautiful, and we get aesthetic experience only from them; other beautiful objects do not inspire us, we perceive them alright, but the beauty therein we do not appreciate. How do we choose these fragments to be inspired by them. Why do we regard only a few objects as beautiful and ignore other beautiful objects? These fragments are selected by us on two bases - subjective and objective. Personal aptitudes, individual interests, momentary moods, sentimental development are subjective elements. They are subjective in the relative sense of the term only; in their last analysis they are also determined, to a great extent, by social conditions. In objective conditions are included those social factors which determine the aesthetic experience, and which we will discuss in the following lines.

Aesthetic experience is neither intuitive, *apriori* nor is upon any inborn capacity. It is *aposteriori* in its nature; it is based upon experience. As in the selection of fragments, so in the determination of aesthetic experience, there are two kinds of bases - subjective and social. Subjectively speaking aesthetic experience is based upon

knowledge, imagination, emotion, association of ideas. Mental and physical health need not be mentioned here as it is the most essential quality of every kind of normal mental activity.

Knowledge is one of the most fundamental conditions of getting an aesthetic experience. Knowledge makes one not only a better observer, but the aesthetic experience is enriched because of one's knowledge. The depth of affection is based upon the height of cognition; and the height of cognition upon the richness of knowledge. Aesthetic experience without knowledge is shallow and of little value. This knowledge is gained from personal experiences as well as from the experiences of others. The former is better than the latter knowledge, whether direct or indirect, must not be superficial. The real knowledge, which is the result of scientific attitude of mind, is required. It is not satisfied with appearance but goes deep, and tries to find out the inner essence of the things. The importance of knowledge is not only direct but indirect too, as it forms part of all other conditions of aesthetic experience i.e. it plays an important part in imagination, emotion etc.

Imagination is another important basis of aesthetic experience. A man having little imagination can perceive the objects, but the perception will be a simple perception and cannot develop itself into an aesthetic or intellectual experience. It is through imagination that the artist reacts to the external world by expressing his own feelings. It penetrates into reality, in order to reveal that which cannot be reached by reason alone. The imagination required for aesthetic experience is not passive; but active and creative which works under a particular plan. The task of imagination is to produce a form. A form, to be artistic must be created, not copied or imitated. It must be created like a new thing, and should not be only a copy of the external objects. To enrich imagination, knowledge - real and scientific - is essential. Without this knowledge, imagination becomes free and uncontrolled; daydreaming rather than active imagination. Imagination must be based upon reality - not necessarily upon actuality - and should not base itself upon impossibilities and improbabilities.

Emotion and Association of ideas are some other essential bases without which we cannot get a rich aesthetic experience. Emotion may be defined and is defined by different psychologists in different ways, but one point is common in all of them and it is the

affective aspect, which is always very deep in every kind of emotion. Emotion is an intense feeling attached to a particular object - real, imaginary or in memory. Unless an object arouses a deep feeling - emotion - in us, aesthetic experience is not possible. We cannot get aesthetic experience from any object unless it touches us very deeply, consciously and rationally. The more deeply and consciously we are touched, the better aesthetic experience we get. But to be touched in this way is based upon the real knowledge of the object. Real knowledge is very essential to enrich the imagination and deepen the emotion. Emotions are so many in number; but love, wonder, curiosity, self-negation, self-assertion, awe, are comparatively of more importance in aesthetic experience than some others.

All these subjective bases of aesthetic experience are only relatively subjective. Leaving aside the organic conception of society, it is a fact that an individual is more intimately related with the society, than apparently it seems so. Knowledge we cannot get unless we are in a society, not only because of the fact that knowledge is mainly of the external and social objects, but also because it is the society which creates those conditions in which acquisition of knowledge is possible. So we may say that knowledge is the knowledge of the society, for the society but by the individual. The imagination of an artist does not work in void and in vacuum but in an historically concrete world, in traditions, what he has learned from his environment. It always forms part of some historical traditions and present circumstances. The matter upon which imagination is constructed is gathered from the world in which he lives historically and geographically. In the selection of fragments also, these social factors play an important part. A fragment of the universe inspires an artist, but his choice of one particular fragment rather than another depends on traditions and other social factors.

Now let us turn our attention to the social bases of aesthetic experience. Because of their complicated nature, action and reaction upon one another and upon individual knowledge, it is not an easy task to count all these different factors and the degree in which they separately influence the aesthetic experience. Of these the important factors are Environment, Tradition, Religion, Morality, Economy, National ideals and inspirations, schooling and training. In environment we include the physical environment and the climate. Environmental circumstances and physical conditions have comparatively little influence upon aesthetic experience but in

no case it is negligible. The same sunny day or rainy season may or may not give aesthetic experience to the people of different countries; similarly the same temperature is enjoyable in one season but not so in another. Environment has an indirect influence upon aesthetic experience through its influence upon other social factors.

Hereditary temperament and disposition and inherited customs of a people compose traditions. Every nation has its own traditions. These different traditions have some common points, but differ in other aspects. The culture of a nation is largely determined by those aspects which are peculiar to that nation. The common points either in different nations or in different ages are called universal aspects. These aspects - common or different - have a share in determining the nature and quality of aesthetic experience. The artist or the beholder with good traditions has a better, and richer aesthetic experience than the person who has no such traditions at his back. It is because of this fact that the cultured and civilized nations have great artists among them.

Religion is a very important factor in aesthetic experience. Religious zeal and sentiment enrich aesthetic experience and beautifies its expression. Beautiful temples and sublime dramas of the Greeks and their paintings and poetry, the great architecture of the Middle Ages and the great painting, Music and poetry of the Renaissance is a proof of it. Sentiments particularly religious are based upon feelings and thus they have a direct influence upon aesthetic experience.

Aesthetic Experience has great moral influence both upon the artist and the beholder. This influence is not the result of direct instruction and teaching, as art does never preach or teach directly, but indirectly through harmonizing and pacifying the emotions, relieving the tension, purifying the mind, and moderating the whole life. But on the other hand moral ideals and values also have a great influence upon aesthetic experience. It does not mean that a person having higher moral ideals must necessarily have a better and richer aesthetic experience, it simply means that these ideals may inspire him and thus he is in a better position to get richer aesthetic experience from the same ordinary objects, which do not inspire others.

The importance of economic factor in aesthetic experience cannot be over-emphasised. The history of the arts proves it beyond doubt, that art is conditioned not a little by economic circumstances. It is no accident that the greatest bursts of artistic production have occurred in wealthy and in leisure class societies as in Athens and Florence. It is only in a well-to-do society that the individuals have leisure to get aesthetic experience, and generally it is the higher and richer class even of these societies which produce a larger number of artists. Economically poor people have little mental peace to get aesthetic experience; if they get it, it is less frequent and relatively narrower in range. Exceptions may be there, but because of other social factors. It does not mean in no case, that there should be a class - a privileged class - in a society to promote the cause of art and literature. It simply means that art cannot progress unless the individuals are not trodden down under the physical needs. The physical needs should be satisfied before we can think of higher values. So progress in art is possible only when the nation as a whole is economically satisfied and has mental peace to devote itself to its progress.

Economic factor has thus great influence upon aesthetic experience, as it modifies the old and creates the new values - moral and aesthetic values.

National ideals and inspirations - political, educative, artistic, etc., have also their share in determining the aesthetic experience. The ideals reshape the whole nation and inspire it to change its destiny. They have their influence on each and every aspect of life, and thus aesthetic experience is also affected. They select the fragments of the universe which must inspire the individuals and also determine the nature of aesthetic experience. Plato was wrong to banish the artists from his ideal state, as a true artist cannot imagine to create a world less desirable than the actual world. But the Fascist dictators were justified, on Machiavellian principles, in banishing them as they were to be inspired by the high national ideals and more desirable world and must inspire the beholders for the same, which the dictators could in no way tolerate.

Schooling and training is of a great importance in getting aesthetic experience. Schooling and training comes under knowledge, no doubt, but it would be emphasised, as it means the knowledge of the technique and the form. For the artist this

knowledge of technique is of great importance, but even for the beholder it is not of less importance. Unless the individual is well-trained, he is not in a position to get aesthetic experience from any object even from the natural sceneries. Really speaking the importance of schooling and training need not be emphasised, as it is too evident.

Thus we see that getting an aesthetic experience depends to a very great extent, upon the social factors.

It is not only in its origin that the aesthetic experience is based upon social factors; in its expression, form, function and appreciation it is also determined to a great extent by the same factors. When aesthetic experience is expressed in one form or the other, the art is created. Creative impulse and our desire for self-expression is a very important condition of creating a piece of art. But there are some other conditions also. These are interest in our fellow beings and their doings, interest in the real world in which we live, and our desire to better it and bring it to a higher standard of values. In these different conditions the social influence is evident and so need not be discussed.

Aesthetic experience may be expressed in different forms. These forms of expressions are selected by the individual, no doubt, but for the society in which the artist lives. It is not for no reason that poetry and drama had progressed in Greece, architecture in Rome, painting in Italy. Different nations have different aptitudes and likings for some particular form of art and their artists generally conform to it. Otherwise the absence of sympathetic audience will benumb the creative impulse of the artists, and thus they would be left with only an incomplete Aesthetic experience.

As far as the function of aesthetic experience is concerned, it is not only enjoyment, though enjoyment is one of the important aims which aesthetic experience must achieve. Besides enjoyment, aesthetic experience, a deep and rich one, must achieve some other aims and objects, particularly after it is expressed in one form or the other. In this article it is not desirable to discuss the aims and objects which we want to achieve by the expression of aesthetic experience. It is easy to say but difficult to defend that aesthetic experience and its expression in any form is itself a valuable thing, and has no other ulterior purpose. Some other important aims of it

are advancement of knowledge, creation of beauty, redemption of the oppressed, enlargement of our sympathies, presentation of truth, educating the mind, pacifying the emotions, relieving of the worries.....And it is not difficult to see the social aspects of all these aims. No beholder can get aesthetic experience from any piece of art and appreciate it unless it achieves at least some of these aims. He enjoys art which solves his problems and betters his life. Does it mean that he enjoys the art because of utility and not because of beauty; no, it does not mean this, no, never. It simply means that utility and beauty are identical, or at least every beautiful object has its utility. Here one point must be kept in mind. The term utility must be used in its proper sense of the word and not only in a limited sense. Our problems are not only material and economic, but also mental and emotional. And if we use the word utility in this sense including mental and emotional usefulness, then, no doubt, utility includes beauty in it.

The relation between aesthetic experience and its subjective and social base is double-sided, of action and reaction. Aesthetic experience is not possible without them but in its turn, aesthetic experience helps them in their progress and advancement e.g. aesthetic experience is based upon knowledge, but it also produces knowledge otherwise it would be a useless form of fancy. The value of the knowledge imparted determines that of aesthetic experience and its expression. So a work of art performs its function properly when it gives us the most valuable knowledge of things - the knowledge of their essence. Aesthetic experience is one of the conditions as well as effects of material, moral and intellectual progress. The degree of its depth and richness and the excellence of its expression is one of the standards of judging the progress. Progress is in proportion to the higher quality of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience has a value. This value is realised through a process of evolution. It is in the process of realization. We are not satisfied with the beauty as we find it in nature and in the art of our predecessors. We try to create new objects of beauty of higher degree and value, and thus to realise it fully. It is realised to the same degree as all the different social values working in aesthetic experience are realised. The realization of one factor is dependent upon the realization of all other factors and vice versa; and thus from the progress of one, the progress in other aspects of life can be broadly measured. But no value can be fully realised, as all of them are in evolutionary process; the more we realise them, the higher

they go in their degree of excellence. The ideal is always away from our reach. It will never be achieved. It ought not to be achieved. The day it is reached, will be doomsday for humanity.

A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS OR FUNDAMENTALISM ?

"There's glory for you" said Humpty Dumpty.

"I don't know what you mean by 'glory'" Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously "Of course you don't - till I tell you.

I meant 'There's a nice knock down argument for you!' "

"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'A nice knock down argument' " Alice objected.

"When I use a word" Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more or less"

"The question is" said Alice whether you can make words mean so many different things"

"The question is" said Humpty Dumpty "which is to be the master - that's all" Alice was much too puzzled to say anything

Lewis Carroll

It is no news to observe that there has been a resurgence of the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism throughout the world, and indeed throughout the world religions. American religious lobbyists demand that biology, geology and kindred sciences be taught in accordance with the Bible rather than with reference to new-fangled supposedly "scientific" discoveries. President Reagan advocates the amendment of the constitution to provide for Christian prayers in schools in a nation founded on Tom Paine's Rights of Man upholding a person's right to religion or irreligion as he so wishes. Orthodox Jews bewail the secular nature of the Jewish state as a betrayal of Yahweh and Torah. It is otiose before this audience to describe the path this phenomenon has taken in Pakistan. Its implications are daily discussed in the Assembly and debated in the newspapers.

It is not my purpose to discuss the merits of this resurgence or to suggest its explanation. Nor do I profess to have more than a passing understanding of the form this resurgence is taking in Pakistan. A Christian's view of Islam is as likely to be misguided as a Muslim's understanding of Christianity. As has been remarked:

"The cow the Hindu reveres is not the cow we see but the cow he sees which might equally be applied to a Christian's view of the Qu'ran or the Muslim's view of Jesus. I shall, therefore, limit this discussion to a consideration of the implications of the resurgence of fundamentalism on the legal system of any given socio-political unit though I shall endeavour to relate some of the general observations to the situation in Pakistan.

In an Islamic society there is little need to elaborate on what is meant by the effect of the revival of fundamentalism on a legal system of a society. It refers to the question of how the laws of the state should be enforced, enacted and construed with relation to the precepts of God as revealed to his community. In the instance of Islam this is by Allah in the Qu'ran. It deserves mention that while this question is much debated in Islam and Judaism it is one of comparative novelty to the Western Christian world. This no doubt explains our apparent stupidity in attempting to understand the problem. This novelty is to be explained by the virtual absence, in Christianity, of specific rules of a prohibitory or penal nature together with a differing understanding of what is meant by revelation in Christian theology. Therefore the following comments are of more application to Islam and Judaism.

The debate usually entails a claim by the fundamentalists (who may or may not accept this label) that the divine precepts must be incorporated into the politicolegal system in the form that they were originally revealed, and the counter claim by the modernist, who is often a philosopher, that this may not achieve the desired aim of implementing that which reflects the will of God. Of course, this may just be a smokescreen by the modernist who simply doesn't like Divine rules and would prefer a new set reflecting his own values. This position is undefendable once it is admitted that the precepts are from God for he is all-knowing and we could not bring verifiable evidence to show he was wrong. However, the Modernist may be as anxious as the Fundamentalist to follow the will of God but his

reason leads him to believe that incorporating the rules as originally given will not achieve this. He believes we may have to use our reason in looking at the principles which lay behind the rules and this may lead us to adopting different rules in certain circumstances.

By stating the question thus I do, of course, sidestep the more fundamental question of whether or not the precepts in question are truly revelations of the deity or whether, due to defect of the communicator, the channel of communication or the recipients of the communication they fail to reflect the divine wishes. For the purposes of this paper I will accept that the community has in its possession a completely accurate record of what God has revealed. I shall refer to this hereafter as the Fundamental Statement.

There are some who hold that once this Fundamental Statement is accepted the question is resolved. The revealed precepts are to be adopted as the law of the state in the form they were originally given. In Islam this means the adoption of the Qu'ran and, by refinement of the above statement, the Hadith and Sunnah of the Prophet, presumably on the basis that these traditions were also divinely revealed. Without commenting on the desirability or not of this process I wish in the remainder of this paper to examine whether the acceptance of the Fundamental Statement does indeed logically and necessarily require that the divine precepts be adopted in the form they were originally revealed and if so, what problems of interpretation remain.

The argument that once the Fundamental Statement is accepted then the divine precepts must be adopted in the form originally revealed involves a number of assumptions which require examination.

The first assumption is that God intended his precepts to be of universal and eternal application unaffected by changes in society or of geography. For example if God had said: "You shall not attempt to swim across River Ravi" at a time when Ravi was a great river possessing dangerous currents and I could not swim. Must I assume that it was intended the prohibition should still apply in a subsequent time when a) Ravi is regrettably a much reduced placid waterway or b) I have learnt to swim proficiently? Is one entitled or indeed required to ask whether the prohibition of riba-the charging of interest in the Qu'ran or in the Jewish Deuteronic Law was intended to apply not only in the context of an agricultural society but also in a more developed economic system?

Society changes not only externally but also internally i.e. in its attitudes. Are we not obliged to consider whether the divine precepts are conditioned by the attitudes of the society at the time the revelations were given? A yes answer to this question appears to be given in my own religion by Jesus's appeal to the question of the divine precepts given by Yahweh to Moses. In Matthew's gospel, Chapter 19, it is recorded that Jesus was asked to rule on when a man could validly divorce his wife. Jesus propounds a different rule than that given by God to Moses. When this is pointed out to him he explains that Moses gave his rule "because of your hardness of hearts" i.e. because of the prevailing attitudes of the Israelites in the wilderness and states that it was not like this "in the beginning" i.e. "in a perfect world" and for Jesus's new community a different rule was appropriate. To make an Islamic comparison, some Muslims hold that the permission in Qu'ran 4.2 to marry up to four wives is a concession in the context of considerable promiscuity and that Allah's ideal is monogamy.

It needs to be stated that once society has changed then the meaning of the divine precepts also changes notwithstanding that the original words remain unchanged. Words such as "contract" "debt" "marriage" are symbols we use to delineate a set of circumstances: "A" the occurrence of which will lead to a set of rights and obligations "B" which are attributed to it by the legal process.

Over the course of time and in different jurisdictions the circumstances which are delineated by the symbols and the rights and obligations which we attribute to those circumstances change. For example the word "debt" in the 7th Century A.D. did not mean the situation of running account credit which my Visa or credit card entitles me to or the practice of a trader paying for his supplies 30 days after receipt. So if we apply the 7th. Century rule on debt to the 20th Century situation we will apply it to a situation to which the word debt in the rule did not refer.

Opponents of these arguments adopt at least two contentions. Firstly it is argued that if society has changed so that precepts no longer apply as they originally did then the answer is not to amend the precepts but to change the society so that it reverts to that which originally existed. There would be force to this argument if it could be shown that the society which existed when the divine precepts were given was a perfect or model society or at least better than the

present society. Since the divine precepts were given for the purpose of changing the existing practices to those that are revealed we can discount this. Even if this were not so it has to be observed that it is not possible to reverse the process of time and history. You cannot recreate an earlier society, by virtue of the experiences of society since then, which serve to determine its present shape.

The second argument, which so far as I am aware is peculiar to Islam is that since the revelation is eternal it must be applied in all ages. I am not competent to discourse on the eternal existence of the Qu'ran save to note that it appears to require a deterministic view of history up to the time it was revealed. However, it should be noted that there is a difference between stating that a set of precepts are eternal and stating that they should be eternally followed. For example when Yahweh ordered the Israelites to cross the Red Sea he was doing so in the particular circumstances of being chased by the Egyptians. It may be that Yahweh desired this from the beginning of time and that his desire on this point will never subsequently change. But we cannot deduce from this that Yahweh intended that thereafter the Israelites should continually be occupied for the rest of time crossing and recrossing the Red Sea.

So far I have advanced for consideration arguments which support the contention that acceptance of the fact that there exists a body of divine precepts, what I have termed acceptance of the Fundamental Statement does not logically require a present society to adopt these precepts in the form that they were originally revealed but provided that such amendments are made in accordance with the principles which lie behind the statements of the revealed precepts. I now wish to consider what problems are to be encountered when the divine precepts, which for Pakistan I suggested comprised Qu'ran and Sunnah of the Prophet, are adopted in the form they were originally given. Problems arise in the following areas:-

Firstly the rules require definition. We need to know what circumstances God was delineating when he used such symbols as "contract, marriage interest" and so on. We also need to know what rights and obligations he intended to attach to them. If we can ascertain the former but not the latter then we are presented with a problem. For example most divine revelations are of the required/encouraged/permitted/prohibited variety. Lawyers can usually only concern themselves with the precepts of the required and prohibited categories. They need to know not only that "all

contracts need to be in writing" but also what happens when they are not? Is the contract void or voidable? Does property and or risk in the goods pass?

It needs to be recognised that often the criteria we use for delineating the circumstances to which a symbol applies, for example the word "contract", are inextricably connected with the rights and obligations we wish to attribute in those circumstances. To define what God meant by the word "contract" we need to know both the circumstances "A" and the rights and obligations "B" which arise in "A".

Secondly, rules appear to be in conflict either because two rules contradict one another or because we cannot be certain what effect a general principle which has been revealed has on any given rule. For example, all three of the major monolithic religions contain statements that God is forgiving and that we should be forgiving also. How should we construe this injunction in a case where a specific penalty for an offence merciful has been prescribed? can we assume that although God is merciful we are never to be? But how often and in what circumstances? Thirdly, the rules do not cover a situation because it is of a novel type.

All these questions, definition, conflict and novelty are problems of interpretation. The fundamentalist may begin to feel uneasy at this. If we admit the need for interpretation we appear to be taking the question out of the hands of God and placing it in the hands of men, thus opening the door to the modernist. In Islam the problem of interpretation is usually resolved by resort to the application of Quias, analogical reasoning and Ijma, consensus. This has come to mean the Quias and Ijma of the 'Four Schools' of jurists. Firstly it should be noted that there is no necessary connection between adopting the Qu'ran and Sunnah and adopting the reasoning of the Four Schools. Analogical reasoning is useful in helping us to identify similarities or likeness between things but it has of itself no mechanism for distinguishing relevant or preferred likeness. Allama Iqbal himself points out that as Quias lacks any internal principle of movement it is barely to be distinguished from IJTIHAD (to exert oneself with a view to forming an independent legal rule). Given this there would seem no logic in the process becoming ossified at a particular point in history. As Hobbes has said: "to have a succession of identical thoughts and feeling is to have

no thoughts and feelings at all." But these are arguments of practice not principle which I am not qualified to pursue.

I will close by observing that the resurgence of fundamentalism and its confrontation with reason is not to be confused with a resurgence of spirituality and the opposition of secularism. It is often in the absence of spirituality that such a confrontation arises. I can do no more than join with IQBAL in quoting the poet Zia:

"Who were the first spiritual leaders of mankind? Without doubt the prophets and holy men. In every period religion has led philosophy, from it alone morality and art receive light. But then religion grows weak and then loses her original ardour Holy Men disappear and spiritual leadership becomes in name the heritage of the doctors of the law. The leading star of the doctors of the law is tradition. They drag religion with force on this track but philosophy says:

"My leading star is reason, you go right I go left.